Hovenier: Opening the bridge could endanger American soldiers in Kosovo

U.S. Ambassador to Kosovo, Jeffrey Hovenier, said in an interview with Radio Free Europe that there is a real risk associated with the opening of the bridge in Mitrovica at this moment, which could affect the safety of NATO soldiers, including American troops.

He emphasized that this could lead to violence and create other problems, and that discussions about this have been ongoing with the Government of Kosovo for months.

Why is it not a good time to open the bridge in Mitrovica, which both Kosovo and Serbia agreed upon in Brussels?

I’m really glad you asked that question because this is an issue which I believe is misunderstood. The United States firmly believes that this is not the time to reopen the bridge to vehicular traffic. Let me clarify one thing. We believe that the bridge should ultimately be open to vehicular traffic, and that is, as you mentioned, part of the EU-mediated dialogue and an agreement was reached on that. But we have asked the Government (of Kosovo) not to proceed at this time.

This request was not only from the U.S.; in the conversation with the Prime Minister of Kosovo, my colleagues from the Quint countries joined me. The reason for this is that we believe there is a real risk associated with taking this action right now, and we believe that this risk increases threats—it could potentially lead to violence and create other problems, both for the local community and for NATO soldiers, including American soldiers who are working to ensure peace and security in Kosovo.

We take actions that could affect the safety of American soldiers supporting Kosovo very seriously. So, our request to the Government, and we have been having these discussions for several months, was—please, do not take this action now. Work with us. We want to help create conditions under which this could happen. But, we do not believe that now is the time.

Who could incite violence?

I cannot speak about who might incite violence. I just know that we have an assessment that violence could occur, and that it is real. And the question of who could be responsible for it, which is very valid, does not negate the fact that violence could occur and that there is a real risk, both for local communities and NATO soldiers. And the United States is not currently interested in exposing American soldiers to additional risk on this issue.

Responding to the closure of the Serbian Post, you said that uncoordinated actions by Kosovo endanger the citizens of Kosovo and KFOR soldiers. In this case, we know that KFOR is constantly present at the bridge. KFOR also believed that this issue should be addressed within the dialogue in Brussels. Could the opening of the bridge at some point lead to a confrontation between KFOR and Kosovo authorities?

I cannot comment on how Kosovo would react in such a situation. I can say that KFOR has been quite clear that it also takes this issue seriously. KFOR shares the same risk assessment that the United States has and that we have shared with Kosovo authorities—that opening the bridge to vehicular traffic at this time would increase the risk for soldiers. And that is why KFOR has also been very clear in its position that this should be done only in a way that mitigates that risk. And we do not believe that the current plans of the Kosovo Government take that risk into account.

Can KFOR refuse to move away from the bridge?

That decision is up to KFOR. KFOR has made several public statements that it is ready to fulfill its obligations, ensure a safe environment, and promote freedom of movement in the country. However, KFOR has also clearly stated in its announcements that it will respond to any threat that increases instability in the region.

Despite the stance of the U.S., the Quint countries, and NATO, Prime Minister Kurti insists that the bridge must be opened and that this move is not aimed against anyone. Recently, we have seen work being done on the bridge, testing of the bridge, and talks with the locals, although very few Serbs attended these discussions, so it seems that Prime Minister Kurti is proceeding with his plan, as outlined at the meeting a few days ago.

I cannot speak about the intentions of the Government of Kosovo. I know that the Prime Minister told me he wants to do things in coordination with the international community, and this is something he has publicly stated. The message from the international community to the Prime Minister was extremely clear: at this moment, we do not support changing the status of the bridge.

And the reason we do not support it is that we believe there is a possibility for increased tensions and violence, which increases the risk for soldiers and local communities, including American soldiers. That was our conversation.

Our hope, you know, our requests were sincere, modest, but clear—that the government would consider the requests of the United States regarding something we believe directly affects the safety of our soldiers and NATO soldiers working in Kosovo. We hope that the Government will listen to this and take these concerns into account.

And if they don’t, what would be the U.S. response?

I don’t engage in hypothetical questions. Kosovo says it is our partner. Kosovo tells us it is the country with the most pronounced pro-American stance in the world. Therefore, I hope that the country with the most pronounced pro-American stance in the world will listen to the specific requests of the United States government not to put NATO, including American soldiers, at risk.

However, right after that meeting with the Quint, the Prime Minister’s office issued a statement saying that the bridge must be opened. And then we saw all these works on the bridge, and the Government of Kosovo moved forward with its plan.

All I can say is this: We made statements after that meeting and shared our views, which, again, are that we are concerned about this action at this time. Again, in the long term, the United States agrees, and I think our European partners agree, that the bridge should be opened for vehicular traffic. That agreement was reached within the framework of the dialogue.

The question is how and under what circumstances, and we do not believe that the conditions are right now. The reason we do not believe the conditions are right now is due to our assessment, which we have consistently shared with the Kosovo authorities, that it increases the risk and threat to local communities and NATO soldiers, including American soldiers.

Why is this bridge so significant when we know that there are other bridges just a few meters away that are open to both pedestrians and vehicles?

I think you would need to ask the Government of Kosovo that question. I don't have a good answer for it.

Do you still consider Prime Minister Kurti a partner? Does he consider you a partner?

I can't speak to how he sees us. I can only say, from the perspective of the United States government, that Prime Minister Kurti and his government have challenged us in certain ways. There are some areas where we have a good and close partnership.

Together, we've done some important things in advancing Kosovo's economy, in trying to help create an economic system that brings greater prosperity to the citizens of Kosovo. We've made real progress with the Kosovo authorities in helping relatively new government institutions to be more effective in their work and to provide better services to citizens, particularly in the area of the rule of law.

But on these issues, I have to say, we have been challenged by the Prime Minister and his government. And I have to say that the quality of our partnership is not what we would hope for on some of these issues related to how he handles the north and how he conducts the dialogue. It's not just about me.

Not long ago, a U.S. Under Secretary visited Kosovo and spoke about the need and our hope for better coordination and cooperation. Our Assistant Secretary for Europe, James O'Brien, also spoke publicly about this.

We had an extraordinary moment—and I'll take the time to read something about it—just last week, following uncoordinated actions targeting post offices in the north, where the State Department spokesperson had this to say: "We are concerned about the continued uncoordinated decisions by Kosovo's leadership. We believe they have jeopardized the opportunities we helped Kosovo create."

If you look at it, since Kosovo's independence, the United States has strongly supported its full integration into the international community as a sovereign, multi-ethnic democracy. But to achieve this vision—and it's a vision we share—we have worked with successive Kosovan political leaders on measures that advance peace and prosperity at home while accelerating Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic path.

What we are asking of this Government of Kosovo, which suggests that we are not there yet, is to return to close and constructive engagement with the United States, the European Union, NATO, and other international partners of Kosovo.

How long will you wait for Kosovo to return to that engagement? How long will you, if I may say, tolerate being challenged?

You know, Kosovo is a sovereign state, and we recognize it as such. So, I don’t know if it’s a matter of tolerance. I think it’s more a question of the quality of our partnership. We have concerns about how committed this government is to partnership with us. When we talk to the government about things they could do that increase the risk for our soldiers, and we’re not convinced that we’re getting an effective response, it affects our view of how much this government takes our concerns into account and how committed this government is to the partnership we want to have.

Are you considering any consequences?

Well, I’m concerned about where this is heading. In the long term, the United States wants to see, and the people of Kosovo want to see, Kosovo progressing into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. We want to see Kosovo in the Council of Europe.

We want to see Kosovo in the EU. We want to see Kosovo in NATO. The way to achieve that is through cooperation with us, with our European partners, with EU leaders, with NATO leaders. For example, just last week, with this uncoordinated action against the post offices, you saw how everyone—the EU, NATO, the U.S., Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy—expressed concern.

I’m worried that these kinds of actions diminish the appetite and reduce the commitment—not commitment, but enthusiasm for supporting Kosovo on its Euro-Atlantic path. Kosovo has already lost an important opportunity to gain membership in the Council of Europe by not responding to the requests of our European partners who can make that decision, meaning it hasn’t met the conditions that (the European partners) expected Kosovo to fulfill to join the Council of Europe.

I’m very concerned that Kosovo’s path to the European Union, its request, and its current application for candidate status, the effective and full implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which is largely in Kosovo’s favor—I’m worried that Kosovo’s stance will negatively impact all of that. My German colleague spoke last week about how the accession path itself could be shelved or frozen.

The EU is talking about additional measures. I really hope there won’t be any additional measures, but that largely depends on the Government of Kosovo and how much it will stop these kinds of actions that we have consistently warned about and start acting in partnership with us and our European partners in the way we have consistently requested. We agree that this is difficult. We agree that tough issues are on the agenda.

But we also think that we have a system and a process that will help Kosovo progress, and that requires this kind of cooperation.

Are the U.S. currently lobbying for Kosovo’s membership in various organizations, or is that on hold?

I haven't seen much enthusiasm in supporting this government's efforts for new memberships in international organizations right now. We made real efforts regarding the Council of Europe, but Kosovo at that time was not willing to take the step that European partners, as well as we, had asked of Kosovo, which was to submit the draft statute for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities to the Constitutional Court for a review of its constitutionality.

That still hasn’t happened.

That still hasn’t happened, and the fact that it hasn’t happened, I have to say, reduces the enthusiasm within the U.S. government to continue trying to make an effort when Kosovo is not willing to take this, from our perspective, fairly minimal and first step in this process.

What will happen if the Government of Kosovo doesn’t submit the draft statute to the Constitutional Court?

That choice is up to the Government of Kosovo, but in my opinion, it will likely mean that many of these processes will stall. There is a dimension of realpolitik here. If you want to join NATO, if you want to join the European Union, if you want to be part of the Council of Europe, you need the support of the countries that are already there.

And we face a challenge, which is that certain countries in these institutions do not recognize Kosovo as we do, that is, as a sovereign independent state. And they have made it clear that their support will partly depend on progress in the dialogue. They want Serbia and Kosovo to reposition their relationship. From our perspective, the Government of Kosovo has not engaged constructively in the dialogue in certain ways. Now, I could say the same for Serbia.

We have spoken about the need for both countries to do much better in fulfilling all their obligations, but since I am responsible for Kosovo, and because I personally and my government institutionally so much want Kosovo to advance on this path and take its place in European structures, we hope to see this government, instead of trying to take actions that make it harder for us to be effective advocates, give us strong arguments in favor of Kosovo’s accession. That hasn’t been happening.

Let’s return to the actions of the Government of Kosovo in the north. The international community has reacted multiple times in the past two years to actions taken by the Kosovo government. However, the government says they have managed to establish order and the rule of law. Do you believe there is more order and rule of law in the north today than there was two or three years ago?

I would say that the situation in the north is different in some ways than it was two or three years ago. But I think if you want to integrate an area, you also need to integrate the people in that area. What I’ve seen recently is an absolute lack of integration of the population in the north in the efforts (of the Kosovo Government) to attract, encourage, and involve them.

Let’s go back again to the issue of the bridge. Very few people showed up. Those who did, who are residents in the north of Kosovo, as far as I understand, were mostly not in favor of opening the bridge to vehicular traffic.

And they spoke about other problems they face, not the bridge.

Exactly, and they are very concerned. So, our hope would be that this government, which absolutely claims to be the government of all citizens of Kosovo, acts accordingly and finds ways to show people that they should integrate into Kosovo and that there are real benefits, and that this government addresses their concerns. At the moment, I haven't met many representatives of the Serbian community who believe that Kurti's government is making successful efforts to show sensitivity and concern for the issues that the representatives of the Serbian ethnic community in Kosovo are thinking about.

You mentioned that this government has put you in challenging situations. Then yesterday, we saw media reports that Prime Minister Kurti might attend the Democratic National Convention in Chicago next week. Can you confirm this?

As I understand it, Prime Minister Kurti plans to attend the Democratic Party's Congress at the invitation of the National Democratic Institute (NDI). But to be clear, this is not an invitation from the U.S. government. The Democratic Party is a political party in the United States. NDI is an arm of the Democratic Party that works on building parties and democratic institutions abroad. So, the invitation came from NDI to the Prime Minister, I believe in his capacity as the leader of one of Kosovo's parties, just as NDI has invited the leaders of other parties in Kosovo. But, it is not an invitation from the U.S. government.

Finally, I would like to ask you about the Banjska case. We are approaching the first anniversary of the attack in Banjska in the north of Kosovo. Milan Radoicic, who led that attack, is still at large, believed to be in Serbia. How much longer will the U.S. wait for Serbia to arrest Radoicic so that he can face charges?

I think the United States has been very clear about our expectations that all those involved in that horrific crime are held accountable. We have said this publicly. And, of course, part of our diplomacy with Serbia has been our expectation that Mr. Radoicic and other perpetrators of this crime be held accountable. This remains part of our discussions. And we hope that this will happen soon. I would note that there is a way Kosovo can help from my perspective.

As I understand it, Serbian officials have stated that they have now officially sent a request through official channels for mutual legal assistance to the Kosovo authorities, asking them to provide evidence they have that the authorities in Serbia need to prosecute Mr. Radoicic. And again, on a political basis, I hope the Government of Kosovo will respond to that request because you would want to ensure that prosecution occurs and that Mr. Radoicic is held accountable for his crime, as well as all others involved.

Are there any results from the investigation? Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabriel Escobar mentioned that there might have been financial and organizational ties between the state of Serbia and the attack in Banjska?

I have nothing more to add on that.

Do you think the lack of accountability for the attack in Banjska fuels the narrative that the West is appeasing Serbia with a softer stance due to geopolitical interests, to ensure that Serbia remains closer to Brussels than to Moscow?

I think the United States has been very clear that we expect both Kosovo and Serbia to meet certain standards. I’ll repeat that my jurisdiction is over Kosovo. So, all I can say is that I believe the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade is quite engaged in trying to ensure that Serbia does what it has committed to doing, which includes holding Mr. Radoicic and other perpetrators accountable for that crime. This also involves Serbia fulfilling all of its obligations that it has undertaken as part of the dialogue, just as we are doing here.