FEUILLETON 25 Years since NATO Bombing of Serbia (Part 30): Preparations for 'Surrender'

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic

Chernomyrdin and his American interlocutors continued their meetings the next day as well. What is interesting from the conversations previously held is the threat from Vice President GORE that America can change its position and opt for Kosovo's independence. This indicates that the idea of Kosovo's independence, and even more so that the USA will be the one to determine which state will exist in the Balkans, vividly illustrates the understanding of the world that existed among American politicians. For them, there was no doubt that the USA decisively determines the existence or non-existence of states, while others will merely be observers in that regard.

Gore expressed this position by stating that some excuse (more than just a "fig leaf") will be needed "to change our position from Rambouillet and say that we support Kosovo's independence. But if this continues, that can change," said Gore.

A few years later, this did happen, and in 2008 the USA recognized "Kosovo" as an independent state. In the first wave, a large number of countries followed American recommendations. Later, after the "Arab Spring" and the rise of the terrorist Islamic State, wars in Syria and Libya, attempts were made to create new borders and reshape the Middle East. One of the main actors were the Kurds, who saw an opportunity to finally create their own state. Despite a successful referendum, they failed to achieve Kurdish independence because the USA and other states were unwilling to accept and recognize Kurdish independence. Somewhat later, a referendum was held in Catalonia, Spain, which also did not have the support of European states. All of this reflected in a clear reduction in support for Kosovo's independence, leading to a wave of withdrawals of recognition.

In the end, Russia's military action in Ukraine led to a broad reassessment of NATO's attack on the FRY and Serbia and the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. As we write this, the reach and consequences of the USA and NATO's relations with Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia, and the Balkans are far from defined and concluded.

In any case,

CHERNOMYRDIN: During yesterday's discussions here and in the Oval Office, we clarified our positions, so I think we need to determine what we are starting from and what to tell the world. Everyone is eager to hear the results of our meeting. So I want to say that we have achieved some great things in the past two weeks. We have laid the foundations and all arrangements for resolving the conflict until the end. I think we have agreed on 99 percent of our positions to end the crisis. So, if Annan is not capable, then who is? Who will negotiate with Milosevic? To whom should Milosevic surrender? From whom should he accept surrender terms? Before Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov's meeting in Oslo, Milosevic did not agree to these positions. He did not agree to the five points of the Washington [NATO] declaration. Now he agrees. [1]

GORE: Have you communicated with him since last night?

CHERNOMYRDIN: No. It's not possible, although we can expect anything from him. He may surrender tomorrow and deny his word. So, it's not about Russia or NATO [taking over the surrender]. It must be the UN. Who will represent the UN? Let's find or create that person who will participate in that process.

GORE: Allow me to start by responding to your first point about the world's interest. I still believe that the less we say, the better the chances of progress. One of the reasons I think it's best to say as little as possible is the need to avoid misunderstandings.

CHERNOMYRDIN: This is clear.

GORE: My colleagues and I would all say that our impression is that we are not 99 percent in agreement. It may be that Russia and we could achieve 99 or even 100 percent agreement because we have a common respect for humanity. But Milosevic does not say anything that would lead us to believe that. About the UN: We believe that a UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII could be the mechanism to give Milosevic an international "fig leaf" to say what needs to be said.

CHERNOMYRDIN: That's the essence of the problem - to whom to surrender and with whom to talk. The resolution needs to be developed.

GORE: After the resolution, the president of the Security Council will speak on behalf of the Security Council, and NATO countries would participate in international forces. Not NATO forces, but a new entity. The commander of that entity would talk to the commander of the Yugoslav forces to see how to implement that arrangement.

CHERNOMYRDIN: I don't trust Milosevic as much as you do. I pushed him, exerted real pressure on him. He is willing to accept the five points. But he must give consent to someone. Let's say I go to Belgrade, talk to him, pressure him. Then we go to the resolution. Then he will start to say "no." He will start talking about monuments, Clark's role, etc. We will be to blame. In the end, we will outline the whole process. He will surrender, but the question is with whom and to whom? We need a mechanism. Let's say you and I, together with Clark, talk to Annan. Let Annan represent the UN. Let's ask Annan, "Do you agree to participate in this process?" He will say "yes." Let him go to Milosevic. If he accepts Annan, the Security Council will pass a resolution.

GORE: Let's go back to the resolution. We need to start drafting it.

CHERNOMYRDIN: You'll see how effective it is.

GORE: We believe that Clark, who has already negotiated, should go there and stay there. We think it's not a good idea for you to go to Belgrade, because if Milosevic refuses, it will look bad. Then we go to the Security Council and ask for the resolution. After that, Clark goes to Milosevic.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Okay, we'll think about it.

GORE: We also think that Annan should be the Secretary-General. The resolution should contain a reference to Chapter VII.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Okay, let's draft the resolution.

GORE: We should make the resolution public as soon as possible. We also need to set a deadline. What do you think?

CHERNOMYRDIN: Agreed. But what deadline?

GORE: Maybe a week. Maybe less. If Milosevic refuses, we'll have to go to the Council and ask for a decision. We believe that Russia and China will not stand in our way. We do not have any information about their intentions. They were interested in the resolution, but we didn't want to say anything about it. We think they would vote for the resolution.

CHERNOMYRDIN: I agree.

GORE: Can we agree that Clark will be the one who will go to Milosevic?

CHERNOMYRDIN: Let's talk about it. I want to consult with Yeltsin, my colleagues. Let me get back to you on this issue.

CHERNOMYRDIN: During yesterday's discussions here and in the Oval Office, we clarified our positions, so I think we need to determine what we are starting from and what to tell the world. Everyone is eager to hear the results of our meeting. So I want to say that we have achieved some great things in the past two weeks. We have laid the foundations and all arrangements for resolving the conflict until the end. I think we have reached an agreement on 99% of our positions to end the crisis. So, if it's not Anan, then who? Who will go to negotiate with Milosevic? To whom should Milosevic surrender? From whom should he accept surrender terms? Before the meeting between Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov in Oslo, Milosevic did not agree to these positions. He did not agree to the five points of the Washington [NATO] declaration. Now he agrees.

GORE: Have you communicated with him since last night?

CHERNOMYRDIN: No. It's not possible, although we can expect anything from him. He can surrender and then deny his word tomorrow. So, it's not about Russia or NATO [accepting surrender]. It has to be the UN. Who will represent the UN? Let's find or create that person who will participate in that process.

GORE: Let me start by responding to your first point about the world's interest. I still believe that the less we speak, the greater the chances of progress. One reason why I think it's best to say as little as possible is the need to avoid misunderstandings.

CHERNOMYRDIN: This is clear.

GORE: My colleagues and I would all say that our impression is that we are not 99% in agreement. It may be that Russia and we could achieve 99 or even 100% agreement because we have a common respect for humanity. But Milosevic is not saying things that would lead us to believe that. Regarding the UN: We believe that a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII could be a mechanism to give Milosevic an international "fig leaf" to say what needs to be said.

CHERNOMYRDIN: That's the crux of the problem - to whom to surrender and with whom to talk. The resolution needs to be worked out.

GORE: After the resolution, the President of the Security Council would speak on behalf of the Security Council, and NATO countries would participate in international forces. Not NATO forces, but a new entity. The commander of that entity would talk to the commander of Yugoslav forces to see how to implement that arrangement.

CHERNOMYRDIN: I don't trust Milosevic as much as you do. I pushed him, put real pressure on him. He is willing to accept the five points. But he must give consent to someone. Let's say I go to Belgrade, talk to him, put pressure on him. Then we go to the resolution. Then he will start to say "no." He will start talking about monuments, Clark's role, etc. We will be blamed. In the end, we will outline the whole process. He will surrender, but the question is when and at what cost. How much blood will be shed? The whole world is watching us. Everyone knows. Europeans agree with this viewpoint. I will do everything I can to force Milosevic to agree to autonomy, forces involving NATO, safe return of refugees to prevent guerrilla warfare. I can't ask for more. For self-governance purposes, someone will be found to lead self-governance. So let's find someone to talk to Milosevic about this. We must resolve the issue of who is in charge, otherwise you make me a hostage of Milosevic.

GORE: Let's send Jesse Jackson.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes (laughter)

BERGER: Return to Belgrade. Then comes the UN Security Council resolution. Then after the Security Council resolution...

CHERNOMYRDIN: Milosevic does not want to surrender to Russia or any country, but to an international organization. The UN. Who will represent the UN? He will not surrender to Russia. Do we even need a UN Security Council resolution? If he is ready to accept the five points, why do we need a resolution? We must press him, set conditions for him to understand that...

GORE: You are right that the essence of the matter is whether Milosevic agrees. If so, the rest is just a formality, not substance - how to find a way not to surrender to Russia or the US. We suggest the Security Council, but if the differences narrow and he is willing to agree to the five principles, then Anan could receive his surrender. We don't want Anan to negotiate, but he could serve as a figure. But narrowing the gap still requires work. I believe in your judgment, but we still have no indication that he is anywhere near it.

CHERNOMYRDIN: He is so close. He told me himself – we are putting in a clause about international presence that implies a safe return of refugees. He said I would agree to NATO military presence. But he thinks we are asking for too much. He asked me if I thought I could trust him. I don't know, but I had a witness. Ivanovsky was there and taking notes. I said I would convey his message, but what is the next step. He has already told me so much. He agreed to withdraw troops. At some point, we can address the issue of the number of troops to be withdrawn. He agreed to international presence, return of refugees. He also faces the question of who will rebuild his country. He knows Russia will not rebuild anything. He needs confirmation, the restoration will be done.

GORE: I can confirm that NATO allies are fully prepared to rebuild the country. We clarified this in Washington. Europeans even more. One thing is most important. We can stop bombing only if he agrees to complete withdrawal. We can almost stop bombing immediately if that happens.

CHERNOMYRDIN: To whom to surrender?

GORE: There are several options. The future president of the EU is Finnish - Mr. Ahtisaari. Everyone trusts him, you know him, he worked on the Bosnia issue for the UN. He is already a member of the "troika."

CHERNOMYRDIN: Under whose umbrella?

ALBRIGHT: He is the next president of the EU. Kofi could appoint him.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Good. That's an option. Anan or someone else would have to appoint him. Put him in charge. He is acceptable.

GORE: And he worked on Bosnia for the UN.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Okay. Then we can see the logic. Otherwise, it's a bottleneck, there's no movement or room to maneuver.

GORE: But we have to work with Kofi quietly to make sure he doesn't try to appoint someone else. It's best not to raise this with him at all. I would rather you hadn't even met him.

CHERNOMYRDIN: I would like to cancel the meeting, but we have already announced it. We can only meet and make a statement.

ALBRIGHT: Kofi wanted to appoint two special envoys, and Ahtisaari didn't want that job. He didn't want to do it full-time. What we're talking about isn't full-time. He would go with you to Belgrade.

CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm not full-time either.

ALBRIGHT: Kofi still wants to appoint others as special envoys. We can talk about this. The first one is Eduard Kukan, and now we need a Western representative. But this is not the same job.

CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm ready for this. I will be with him (Ahtisaari).

 TALBOT: You are the one who will use the hammer on Milosevic and

Ahtisaari is the one who will receive the sword from him.

CHERNOMYRDIN: I think we cannot find a better person.

GORE: Okay. This shows that you were right to continue this morning. Let's now think about what we need to tell the press.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Ahtisaari also needs a mandate so that everyone understands that this is not just another task acting on behalf of the UN.

GORE: We need to move quickly.

ALBRIGHT: Let's try to do it today.

CHERNOMYRDIN: We should finish today. Let's not waste time.

GORE: I agree. We'll work with Kofi today. The less we say to the journalists, the better. We'll avoid any statements about compromise, concessions, surrender.

CHERNOMYRDIN: No talk of concessions. We're looking for ways... It can't be harder with a war going on. Do you think Ahtisaari would refuse this?

TALBOT: I know him very well for several years. I talked to him about whether he should take on the job of special envoy for Kofi. I understand why he refused that job. My personal assessment is that he would be interested in the role you describe. But we must be cautious in the next 48 hours because the Germans are chairing the EU. No one, including the Germans, thinks they are the ones who will receive the sword from Yugoslavia. So, first we need to try to...

ALBRIGHT: We need to call Fischer so he understands what we're doing.

USHAKOV: [discussion on communications

with Chernomyrdin] If you succeed. I will call Victor Stepanovich and inform him.

GORE: We'll communicate before you see Kofi.

BERGER: Let's be clear on the public line. We had good meetings, tried to understand each other's positions, Chernomyrdin plays a useful role, talks will continue.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Well, I wouldn't say I'm instrumental.

BERGER: Okay, we won't say that.

CHERNOMYRDIN: (jokingly) Because other Russians might be offended.

TALBOT [speaking in Russian]: You can say that Americans were key, except, of course, for the bombing.

CHERNOMYRDIN: (describing the bombing in Belgrade) It seems that as soon as I arrived, they started bombing Belgrade. After eight hours of talking to Milosevic, my jacket was completely wet. We took off and looked down - only one street was lit. We could see flashes from the anti-aircraft fire. I guess they were trying to shoot us down.

GORE: You know those were Russian air defense systems.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Possible.

GORE: Madeline will call Kofi. And keep in mind that this is not the position of a permanent envoy.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes. Like me. Interim appointed.

BERGER: One quick trip and he says, "Yes."

GORE: I'm glad you came back this morning. Maybe that will lead to the breakthrough we need. (discussion on travel plans)

CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm ready to fly to Finland or Belgrade or anywhere.

ALBRIGHT: There's a G8 meeting on Thursday.

CHERNOMYRDIN: It would be a waste of time if we couldn't find out their plans.

ALBRIGHT: But we should try to meet.

CHERNOMYRDIN: Okay, let's move on. Let me know if you fail with Ahtisaari.

ALBRIGHT: We'll call.

GORE: This is the first time I've heard Victor Stepanovich talking about failing at something.

So, with almost full agreement with his hosts, or as Deputy Gor put it, '99 or 100 percent,' this Chernomyrdin Washington tour has ended.

With such a clear overall role that Viktor Chernomyrdin had, some Russian media have again sparked debate about which side Milosevic is on, suspecting him again of preferring to make deals with Americans rather than Russians. Thus, the newspaper 'Kommersant' praised Chernomyrdin because he 'succeeded in recent days in doing almost the impossible – to bring NATO and Belgrade closer to a compromise that will stop the war in Yugoslavia, but it is unlikely that Russia will succeed in becoming the main peacemaker in the Balkans: Slobodan Milosevic would rather surrender to Americans.'

"American media reported yesterday that the negotiations between Viktor Chernomyrdin and American leaders, which they called a turning point in the war with Yugoslavia, have ended. At the meeting between Chernomyrdin and Clinton, no diplomatic breakthrough was achieved. But the prospects for stopping the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia became clear. For the first time, the American president officially stated that the attacks could be stopped. On the same day, at a meeting of representatives of the foreign ministries of the G8 in Bonn, the West agreed that peace forces would enter Kosovo under the UN flag.

"Neither Chernomyrdin nor Clinton revealed the details of the negotiations. However, according to information from Kommersant, Clinton agreed to issue an order not to bomb Yugoslavia if Milosevic meets at least two conditions: begins to withdraw his troops from Kosovo and agrees to the deployment of an international contingent in the region, whose basis will be NATO forces, even under the UN flag. Chernomyrdin tried to persuade the U.S. president to limit himself to the first demand – the withdrawal of Serbian troops. The Russian emissary proceeded from the fact that Milosevic would not agree to send troops to Kosovo among which are NATO members. Despite this divergence in the positions of Moscow and Washington, a senior State Department official said: 'The Russian approach is now closer to our position than to Milosevic's position, whom Moscow is trying to persuade to reconsider his position.' Chernomyrdin's associates did not rule out the possibility of him flying to Belgrade again and continuing to persuade Milosevic.

"Milosevic himself, however, has already realized that a war with NATO 'to the bitter end' could end badly for him personally, and he began to flirt with the Americans. He released three American soldiers captured on March 31 near the Macedonian border and handed them over to the American missionary and Clinton's personal friend Jesse Jackson during his visit to Belgrade. Then Milosevic sent a personal letter to the President of the United States, whom Serbian propaganda yesterday called a 'butcher and villain,' with an offer to meet and negotiate. Finally, Milosevic gave an interview to the 'Washington Times,' in which he admitted for the first time that 'Serbs are not angels' and that 'bad things' were happening in Kosovo. True, they are not the responsibility of the regular army, but Serbian paramilitary forces.

"Further actions by Milosevic can also be predicted: it will be announced that the President of Yugoslavia did not want to fight against the whole world, but someone from his entourage, and this radical will bear all the blame for the current tragedy. Then Milosevic will take a peaceful course, start negotiations with Richard Holbrooke - it is unlikely that Clinton will sit at the same table with Milosevic - and finally accept NATO's demands. For Moscow, which has allowed itself to be deceived by Milosevic again and has become a tool in his hands, this will be a good lesson," concluded the commentator from Kommersant, Gennady Sisoyev.

Neither the President of Yugoslavia nor his associates liked the behavior of the Russian envoy, but they knew they had no one else to rely on. All they could get from others, if anyone, would be much less than what they got from someone like Chernomyrdin. It is quite possible that Milosevic tried to avoid this mediation in which he did not feel comfortable or welcome and to try again to negotiate with Clinton. A direct line between the American president and Milosevic in that case would exclude Russian mediation, and thus diminish the significance and role of Russia, so Russian officials could rightly be dissatisfied with such a development – if it had occurred."

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