FEUILLETON Henry Kissinger, America, and Kosovo (13): Comparing the bombing of Serbia and Vietnam

Writing for Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic

In an interview with the Associated Press on May 20, 1999, Kissinger reiterated that he had not supported the US policy before the NATO attack on FR Yugoslavia in 1999.

The interview focused on the issue of humanitarian interventions and linked events in Rwanda to those in the Balkans. Kissinger reiterated that ethnic conflicts were a part of the history of many African states, but in a way, it was the history of the Balkans.

He said that before the NATO action, there had been no ethnic cleansing "to the full extent", and added that he believed it would not have started without the bombing, although he commented that this entered into a circular debate about what had come first. When asked if Clinton's Kosovo policy had the same problems as the Indochina policy, Kissinger replied that there had been a similarity in the sense that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations went into Vietnam thinking they could win with technological superiority but misjudging the element of endurance, and that was "clearly true in Kosovo and the Balkans".

Kissinger confirmed that the risks in Indochina had been much greater.

It was about not considering that much weaker opponents, as Vietnam had been earlier or Serbia at the time, would be able to resist and fight for much longer than anyone believed. For Serbia, it was assumed that a few days of bombing would be enough to force Serbia to capitulate.

In a conversation with senators in April, Kissinger expressed his disbelief that Serbia would surrender quickly.

"I believe that at least a part of the organization reflected the conviction, at least of all those I talked to, that Milosevic would give in very quickly. They often told me that, when the bombing started, he would have an excuse to settle. I must say that I never believed in that, although I wouldn't believe that he could withstand this much against the combined NATO air force", Kissinger admitted.

Therefore, he suggested that in future military operations, a clear distinction should be made between the decision to go to war and the conduct of war.

"I wouldn't go this way."

"If someone has decided to go to war, then they must have a strategy for victory. This gradual escalation has been the curse of American strategy from the Vietnam War onwards", Kissinger compared.

According to him, a mistake was made when the NATO Council decided to go to war, and the NATO Council is a group of ambassadors. The decision should have been accepted at the highest level. Once this is done, a military commander should be appointed, and given the authority to work towards victory, which is defined before the start of the war.

"It's a very strange way to go to war to say, let's start bombing and see what happens, then we'll see again. That's a path to paralysis", Kissinger pointed out. NATO did not have a strategy for victory but announced that it wanted to prevent ethnic cleansing, which did not happen, as bombing only intensified it.

Kissinger reiterated that the "Rambouillet agreement, the so-called agreement, was no longer applicable. I keep reading that the longer this lasts, Milosevic risks losing Kosovo more. He has already lost Kosovo through actions taken. Anything that would mean keeping Kosovo in Serbian hands will now be a defeat for NATO, and that is a fact we must face. If I were in a position to do it, I wouldn't go this way. I would let autonomy develop over a longer period", Kissinger explained.

In response to a similar question from Senator Snow during the April debate, whether enough was done before and after Rambouillet to leverage Russian influence on Serbia, Kissinger provided an answer that reiterated his favor toward Holbrooke rather than Madeleine Albright. "I thought a better strategy would be to work out the agreement Holbrooke negotiated last October, which is a ceasefire, and add to it the political provisions of Rambouillet, i.e., the definition of autonomy, strengthen the unarmed inspectors there, and add a warning that any ethnic cleansing will encounter NATO resistance", Kissinger said.

Kissinger's prophecy

He reiterated that on that path, "autonomy gradually emerged". At some point, the Serbs might have decided that it was not politically profitable for all of this to continue. Even if this is wrong, if they had dismantled all of this, we could have done a much more decisive counterattack than what we did. This would seem wiser to me than the complicated procedure we chose, both politically and strategically", Kissinger reiterated.

Associated Press journalists reminded Kissinger of his famous prophecy from a conversation with British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, in which he predicted that the 21st century would be brutal and that he would be "fortunate not to witness it", asking him what led to such a forecast.

Kissinger recalled that it had been the time of the collapse of the Nixon administration in July 1974, secondly, that the Middle East war had just ended, and it had been in the midst of an ethnic conflict in Cyprus between the Greeks and Turks that he and Callaghan had been trying to contain. "Parties, as often happens in ethnic conflicts, were not interested in global politics but in their problems. In that sense, we somehow sincerely exchanged ideas that the desirability of peace is not entirely convincing for parties in an ethnic conflict", Kissinger explained.

Starting from Kissinger's position that there are only two outcomes of ethnic conflicts – division or one group's victory over the other – Associated Press journalists asked him if there was a middle ground and what role superpowers played in this. He replied that in the United States, they talked about how people of different ethnic groups lived together, but these were ethnic groups that had turned their backs on their homeland and had started a new existence. "Long-lasting ethnic problems are those in which ethnic groups live on more or less the same territory and will not allow it to be governed by another side", Kissinger pointed out.

When reminded of an interview with the Bosnian Ambassador to the UN, Muhamed Sacirbey, and his assessment that the Cold War was in a lull and that a red-black coalition was emerging with nationalists joining former communists, Kissinger responded that it could happen in Russia. Asked if it was a threat, Kissinger said it was and added that "the war in Kosovo contributes to it because it has provoked a public reaction that everyone agrees surpasses the Moscow elite".

In that Associated Press interview on May 20, 1999, Kissinger clarified his stance on humanitarian intervention.

"If you use military force and are not willing to endure sacrifices, then you come to the dilemma we are facing in Kosovo now. And then the only way to win is for the population of the opponent to suffer because of it, which is a strange definition of morality and humanity. I do not believe, I do not accept this concept of humanitarian foreign policy. In specific, horrible cases like Rwanda, I could say that the conscience of humanity is so hurt that one cannot really be in a world where this is happening. In Kosovo, I believe we could have prevented the worst ethnic cleansing diplomatically, and I think we started down this path at least too early".

Influence on the whole world

Henry Kissinger discussed the impact of the NATO attack, led by the United States, on Serbia, on the entire world, and on the global order. Kissinger elaborated on the influence of this military operation in the article "A New World Disorder", published in "Newsweek" on May 30, 1999, just a few weeks before the conclusion of this NATO action.

Kissinger began by concluding that the war on the "ultimate fringe of the Balkans had political consequences that extend far beyond Kosovo". In Russia, there was a bitter sense of humiliation due to NATO's actions that spread from the elites to the general population, threatening to spoil US-Russian relations in the years to come. In Beijing, the strong reaction to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade gave vent to frustrations over the unstable nature of Sino-American relations that had been building up for months. In Europe, the seemingly united front of the Atlantic Alliance became fragile: key allies looked toward an exit strategy, domestic opposition was growing, and newly admitted NATO members in Central Europe were uncomfortable that their first alliance activity was a war initiated by NATO.

For Kissinger, the causes of such behavior and reactions in Russia and China are clear enough. Their leaders are products of societies that interpret decisions on war and peace based on whether they enhance the security of the nation or other vital interests. If they cannot discern such a traditional rationale for US behavior, they attribute American motives not to altruism but to a hidden plan for dominance.

In Europe, the situation is more complex. Allies share American motives but begin to question American judgment. They are increasingly under domestic pressure, arguing that the damage from bombing Serbia is increasing the destruction of Kosovo.

Continuation tomorrow: Differences between Kissinger and Madeleine Albrigh