FEUILLETON: Serial - 25 Years of NATO Bombing of Serbia (25): NATO will die in Serbia

Written for Kosovo Online by: Dragan Bisenic

In the same statement, NATO leaders presented five demands to President Milosevic: "Ensure a verifiable stop to all military actions and an immediate end to violence and repression in Kosovo"; withdraw military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; allow the stationing in Kosovo of an "international military presence," believed to imply NATO forces; enable the safe return of refugees; and work on an agreement "based on the Rambouillet Accords."

Czech Ambassador to NATO, Karel Kovanda, called the bombing of Serbia a "baptism of fire." Against the will of most politicians in the country, he insisted that the Czech Republic support the attacks on Serbia. At that time, Havel was the only Czech politician who firmly stood behind the ambassador and did not back down. Kovanda believed that Prague deserved a better image and came up with the idea of NATO organizing the next summit in the Czech capital, recalled Vondra.

Every representative left with the conviction that NATO must emerge victorious; anything less could potentially lead to the demise of the alliance itself. Significant progress occurred on the last day of the conference, April 25, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin called President Clinton to discuss ending NATO's military action against Serbia. This conversation also resulted in a commitment from the Russian president to end the war. Yeltsin initiated a negotiating process that eventually diplomatically isolated Milosevic and led to the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.

Meanwhile, the NATO Summit in Washington is seen in Belgrade as a potential next fatal mistake – the decision on a ground invasion. All Yugoslav officials unequivocally assured that Yugoslavia would defend itself against the threat of occupation and capitulation.

NATO is now celebrating 50 years of existence, but this will not be a moment of triumph, but a moment crowned with sorrow and shame. NATO will die in Serbia. For us, it is a great honor - to reject the attacks of such a strong enemy. They conducted occupations, but we refuse them, said Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.

The celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary in Washington means for people in Yugoslavia a remembrance of the ideas of freedom, equality, and international order, commented the spokesperson of the Socialist Party, Ivica Dacic, at the Summit in Washington. Dacic said that NATO tried to break the spirit of freedom of the Serbian people. Yugoslavia in 1941 said "No" to Hitler, and now we do not accept capitulation. "Attacks on the media show that the criminals have not achieved their goals," said Dacic.

Vice President of the Serbian Government, Vojislav Seselj, said, “NATO now attacks from a safe distance, but if they come to Serbian soil, they will feel the power of Serbian weapons.”

Minister of Information, Milan Komnenic, confirmed the same stance. "Yugoslavia will not capitulate. We have only one option: to defend our country," said Komnenic.

High-ranking officers in the Yugoslav Army also emphasized the army's capabilities to defend the country from a ground invasion. General Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the Third Army based in Kosovo, said that the Yugoslav Army would not be defeated by a NATO ground invasion. "We now have 150,000 people under arms. If every third shot were accurate, it would not be minor casualties for NATO," explained Pavkovic.

Commander of the Pristina Corps, General Vladimir Lazarevic, said that NATO had already started an air-ground operation in the zone of his corps. "On a line from 15 to 20 kilometers, a ground aggression began, mainly by troops of Albanian terrorists gathered from all over Western Europe, with air support."

General Lazarevic stated that Yugoslav losses were minimal, that combat capabilities were fully preserved. Commander of the Yugoslav tank units, General Slobodan Kovacevic, said these units had practically no losses. He said that the Yugoslav tank M-84 is one of the very modern combat tanks. "But the most important thing is that we do not attack anyone, but defend our country," said Kovacevic.

Chernomyrdin's Views Prompt Quick Reactions in Serbian Political Life. Already on Sunday, April 25th, the Vice President of the Federal Government, Vuk Draskovic, criticized the Yugoslav approach to the international community. His criticism aligned with what the Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin had stated in a meeting with Slobodan Milosevic three days prior. Draskovic emphasized that "Yugoslavia cannot defeat NATO." "The people leading the country must say where the country will stand after 20 days, where is Russia, where is the public opinion in the West. Some of these patriots lie and claim that we will defeat NATO," Draskovic stated during a special broadcast on TV Studio B. TV Studio B is managed by the municipal authorities of Belgrade, which belong to Draskovic's party - the Serbian Renewal Movement. Draskovic criticized the state media, leftist parties, and the political approach of the Yugoslav leadership.

Many say that national unity is the primary goal. The most important thing is to understand the reality, said Draskovic.

Our fate depends on what is in the minds of the people leading this country. There's no sense in those who lie on bridges telling people that World War III starts tomorrow. Russian communists have an interest in supporting our tragedy, as they can win in the battle for the Kremlin. Russia has nothing else, it issues sharp warnings, and after such warnings, it calls its Western partners with explanations and excuses. Russia needs Western support and has not given us "Sukhoi" planes or S-300 missiles and will not start World War III.

Here it is hidden who supports us abroad. They are Maoists, anarchists, former members of the "Red Brigades". No one can answer where the red flags in Washington, Berlin, all over the world come from. Are they communist countries? The world's public opinion simply does not support us. We cannot expect the disintegration of NATO, Russia's help, and public opinion. Unfortunately, we are alone, Draskovic said.

He continued to criticize state media propaganda. "They talk about criminals. Planes are criminals, Western leaders are homosexuals, maniacs, NATO soldiers are drugged. Our army is honest and respects the enemies. Those who are not on the front, whom additional bombs call out that we cannot use to rebuild our state - Draskovic questioned.

The Socialist Party stated two days ago that we belong to the freest country in Europe. My God! Is a country under bombs a free country? - added Draskovic.

Draskovic said he believes that in the coming days Russia and Western countries will align their plans with the UN Charter. "To all who say that we should reject this and defeat the whole world, to all of them we must say 'no'," said Draskovic.

We must be ready to accept the return of refugees and welcome humanitarian organizations. The arrival of international forces will facilitate this process. The Federal Government has accepted almost everything. We accept a political agreement. The Assembly of Serbia has accepted international presence.

The question now is which forces are appropriate? Can they be civilian forces? Chernomyrdin in Moscow said that this is impossible," said Draskovic.

U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin spoke by phone on April 26. U.S. Vice President Al Gore began by reflecting on the phone conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, which lasted 90 minutes and was about Kosovo, referring to the conversation the previous day, April 25th.

Yeltsin proposed reactivating the Chernomyrdin-Gore commission, which was active while Chernomyrdin was the Russian prime minister.

As Strobe Talbott testifies, Yeltsin called Clinton, the conversation began with his attempt to evoke Clinton's sympathy for something he was against in Russia itself. There are forces in the military and the Duma, Yeltsin said, advocating sending a fleet to the Mediterranean, providing weapons for Belgrade, including anti-aircraft systems that would endanger NATO pilots. Yeltsin also informed Clinton that he had already dismissed a commander from the Far East.

• This guy - tried to assemble a battalion that would travel to Serbia. "A plan was brewing" to create a "union" between Yugoslavia, Belarus, and Russia.

He was determined to keep these forces under control, but he needed Clinton's help, which was a clear sign that Russia would stab the political allies, business associates, military commanders, and intelligence services of Milosevic in the back.

Do not push Russia into this war! - Yeltsin practically shouted into the phone at Clinton. - You know what Russia means! You know what it has! Do not push Russia into this!

When Clinton heard the translation of Yeltsin's brief speech, he pursed his lips and raised an eyebrow. Instead of reacting to what seemed very close to a warning and the danger of a nuclear war between America and Russia, Clinton chose to, in as positive a way as possible, repeat the conditions for fulfilling Yeltsin's wishes. The call was very helpful, he said, because it "clarified" what could happen if there were or were not a pause in the bombing. Clinton promised that Gore would immediately call Chernomyrdin, and that he would send me to Moscow as the initial point of contact for a new U.S.-Russian initiative.

Suddenly reassured, Yeltsin expressed satisfaction: "I think our conversation was open, constructive, and balanced. We did not let our feelings get in the way, although I was a bit more talkative than you."

Since the Gore-Primakov commission already existed, Gore simply proposed adding their "channel" to the "dialogue". Gore continued in a very friendly tone, saying, "I know you so well, friend." He reminded Chernomyrdin that he had spent 9 hours with Milosevic, which is why Clinton asked Strobe Talbott to go to Moscow and get a "complete briefing" to better understand Milosevic's position. However, the news was ambiguous: from the Russian side, it was heard that the conversation was constructive and should lead to a resolution, but from Belgrade, it was heard exactly the opposite, that Milosevic remained "entrenched in old, unacceptable positions," so clarifying everything that was achieved, "questions where Milosevic refused to cooperate and the nature of Milosevic's situation" was very important. Talbott was supposed to inform the Russian side about the discussions in Washington with all NATO members that were held before marking 50 years of NATO's existence.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: I know Mr. Talbott is already here in Moscow, and I will meet him tomorrow. First, he will talk at 9 o'clock with Mr. Ivanov, our foreign minister, and then we will meet with him. I will inform him about our stance in the first phase and my conversations with Milosevic. It was a difficult conversation and we must convince him of many things, which is not easy. One thing he accepted is the international presence there. Of course, he is against NATO, but there are some shifts in his position and obviously, we need to make some kind of compromise. What is essential is that you have expressed certain positions in the statement you adopted in Washington that coincide with those we hold and sometimes Milosevic says. These positions were discussed with Mr. Ivanov and Madam Albright. All we need now is to deepen these positions. I just talked to Mr. Milosevic's deputy, Mr. Draskovic, ten minutes before our call, and he also accepted the international presence. He shares many of our positions. Tomorrow we will talk to Mr. Talbott and it will be a big conversation and we will see what compromises are possible.

We must meet at one point and at one time. So that the situation does not worsen. All that is needed is to find some kind of compromise.

Vice President Gore: There are three issues that I would like to ask you to pay special attention to because we need to understand every detail, and Strobe can follow this. The first is the complete withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. All members of the Contact Group, including Russia, have agreed on this issue.

There can be no compromise on this issue. But what we hear from Milosevic is that he will only consider reducing his forces. There is simply no way to return the refugees to Kosovo if Serbian forces are still on the ground. Viktor Stepanovich, can you tell me if there was any agreement on the complete withdrawal of forces, including VJ, MUP, and paramilitary formations?

CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes, he agreed, but only to reduce his armed forces to the limits he had in the pre-war period, and the same applies to the police forces that are there to ensure peace and order. He, of course, insists that NATO should also withdraw its forces from the Yugoslav border. We did not discuss the details of how much to reduce the armed and police forces, but, of course, the police are needed there to ensure elementary peace and order. It was difficult to agree on anything at the first meeting. We must continue. He said he would reserve some police forces in the Serbian part of Kosovo.

GOR: Well, then, obviously this is something that will require much more discussion. But allow me to move on to another point, which is the nature of international security forces. President Clinton and NATO have clearly stated that we would welcome a UN mandate, although the command and control of the UN do not work, as we have seen in Somalia and the early days of Bosnia.

Bosnia is a good model to start with. There is a key role for NATO (which is essential for our participation, for the return of Albanians, and for enabling the force to disarm the KLA). But Russia should be a key participant along with other non-NATO countries and other organizations such as the OSCE. We are not interested in what the force is called. It does not need a NATO sign over the door or NATO patches on the uniforms. But they must be security forces, otherwise, civilians and refugees simply will not return.

Now I think we cannot continue if there is any Serbian police or VJ or MUP there, but as far as international security forces are concerned, there is a basis for our position to be accepted by Milosevic. Has he moved at all on this issue?

CHERNOMYRDIN: This was the main issue we discussed with him. He accepted international security forces and said they could be... soldiers from Greece or other NATO countries can participate in international forces, but he emphasized that Russia must be largely represented in these forces... Ukraine as well and from South Africa, but I completely agree with you that there is no need to put a sign on the door or put a NATO emblem on the uniform. The main thing is that it be under the auspices of the United Nations. He insists on significant participation from Russia. We can talk about geography later. The main thing is to find a compromise. He agreed that international forces should be led by someone from the United Nations.

Gore then presented NATO's conditions for stopping the bombing. "Milosevic should do five things: First, provide a verifiable halt to all military actions and an immediate end to violence and repression in Kosovo; second, withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces; third, agree to the stationing of an international military presence in Kosovo; fourth, agree to the unconditional and safe return of all displaced and refugee persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian organizations; and fifth, provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on establishing a political framework agreement. I know President Yeltsin wants NATO to stop air strikes the moment a diplomatic initiative begins. But that will not succeed. We will stop the bombing when he clearly begins to withdraw his forces in a rapid schedule and accepts our conditions. We must have more than promises. We have seen him break those promises too often. Strobe can track these points, but I wanted to make sure you heard from me regarding this third issue," said Gore.

Chernomyrdin responded that it can be considered that "half of the points match," adding that "one conversation he had with Milosevic has already revealed the possibility of further work," as he agreed to withdraw his troops and what is needed is to establish security conditions for the return of refugees. There must be someone to ensure security, and that is the international forces," said Chernomyrdin. Gore commented with satisfaction that "there is room for creativity" and informed Chernomyrdin that if Russia plays this "right," it could be a great victory for Russian diplomacy and the Russian peace mission "which will help you bypass critics who want to militarily drag Russia into the conflict."

Chernomyrdin has elaborated in several places in his book Russian involvement in wars for "Slavic solidarity," pan-Slavism, and other myths. He devotes special observations to the "myth of Slavic unity," further elaborating Solzhenitsyn's theses. "Slavic brotherhood is one of the most ephemeral, but emotionally explainable myths I encountered during my work in Yugoslavia," he says. Without this myth, many processes in history, especially more recent ones, would have been different, in any case, there would have been fewer losses. "I am convinced that exploiting the theme of Slavic brotherhood, especially at that time, could bring nothing but harm. That's why I was so cautious then about such a delicate idea of 'Slavic brotherhood' and practically excluded it from use." Shortsighted state policy based on stereotypes, so far from reality. Unfortunately, that's how it was, not once in history, and I wish it only ended in disappointment.

The European political map often changed, some Slavic brothers came closer together, others split radically, says Chernomyrdin. In practice, Slavic peoples, led by shortsighted politicians, more easily unite with other peoples, carriers of a completely different culture, religion, language, than with Slavs. And when it comes to divorces, Slavs were the first in Europe to rush into a divorce sprint, impatiently and unhesitatingly breaking centuries-old complex ties and good neighborly relations, wrote Chernomyrdin in his reckoning with the idea of "Slavic solidarity."

In the Western Slavic world, awareness of great Slavic unity has been lost and now "from the Slavic tree," dry branches are dying off. "Whoever talks a lot about brotherhood, solidarity, is either cunning or does not understand the political situation in Europe. Today, countries of former Soviet allies - countries we called Slavic, have long been in line for NATO to grant them a modest place even behind the door. From the moment of NATO's expansion to the east, it has been shown that the leaderships of Slavic countries do only what the stronger ones - the USA, the EU, NATO - deign to order them." "That's how it is," says Chernomyrdin, "we saw it during the development of the Yugoslav drama. Politicians of Eastern Europe thought least of all whether the Yugoslavs were brothers to them."

In Chernomyrdin's words, one can sense a kind of revenge for the Yugoslav stance from the time of communism when Yugoslavia broke with the Cominform policy. "Yugoslavia itself," says Yeltsin's envoy, "often turned to the wealthy Western uncle, forgetting Russia." In his explanation of inter-Slavic relations, Chernomyrdin said nothing about the relationship of interwar Yugoslavia to the Bolshevik revolution, which Yeltsin's Russia declaratively most sharply rejected and condemned.