The perspective from 2005: Putting Serbia in front of the fait accompli of an independent Kosovo

Source: demokracia.com

Writing for Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic, a journalist

We often wonder whether events can follow ideas, or whether they have their own logic and determinism that is not subject to external adaptation. This not only speaks to the value of ideas but also assesses the possibility of predicting the direction in which these events are moving. As always, sometimes plans and ideas come to fruition, sometimes forecasts are accurate, and sometimes they are not. An interesting example of such a mix is the report from the New York Council on Foreign Relations from 2005 dedicated to the issue of Kosovo and Serbia, where the main currents and processes were completely presumed, while for others, it's only a chronological inversion.

It was proposed that Serbia would receive candidate status for the EU as early as 2006, which it actually obtained six years later! Also, in the same year, 2006, all of Serbia's external debts were supposed to be forgiven, and on top of that, Serbia would receive significant economic aid. There was only one condition: Serbia needed to renounce Kosovo the following year and recognize it. To recall, all this happened three years before the "independence of Kosovo" was actually recognized.

This was the essence of the report from the influential American Council on Foreign Relations on the Balkans titled 'Forgotten Intervention'. The authors were General William Nash and Amelia Breznik. The report was based on an earlier Balkans 2010 report. In addition to recommendations on Kosovo, assessments were given on the state of the then-state union of Serbia and Montenegro.

The most important recommendations of this report are:

Put Serbia before the fait accompli of an independent Kosovo
Reward it for good behavior with debt relief, economic aid, and EU candidate status in 2006
Assist reformists in parliamentary elections
Marginalize obstructionist groups
Accelerate the reform of security and military structures
Do not change Dayton
Do not oppose independent Montenegro as it is no longer a threat to stability

It was presented that the independence of Kosovo should be formalized through a "carefully structured state agreement", and it was defined as follows: "Independence with accompanying conditions and a carefully structured state agreement provide the best chances to appease all concerns. This is the most likely outcome for Kosovo, a fact increasingly accepted, if not openly, by observers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic".

An identical solution was offered for both the state union and Kosovo: the independence of Montenegro. "Unlike 2002 when there were fears in the international community that independent Montenegro would destabilize the Balkans and fuel Kosovo's demands for independence, the international community no longer has to be seriously concerned if Montenegro decides to withdraw from the Union with Serbia".

Regarding the transaction "Independence for Kosovo, EU and money for Serbia", it is noted that there is international consensus and readiness on several points. Kosovo cannot be returned under Belgrade's authority, even with significant autonomy. Also, the division of Kosovo is unacceptable, as two-thirds of Serbs live in rural areas in the Ibar Valley with an Albanian majority. The division is impossible without extensive population relocation, and besides, it contradicts the goals of the US intervention in 1999. Everyone agrees that Kosovo cannot join another state – Albania, southern Serbia, or Macedonia – to create Greater Albania.

If necessary – without Russia and China

The report describes the technology needed to reach the final status for Kosovo, concluding that the UN doesn't need to conduct or control the process of determining the final status, nor does it need to define it. This methodology, it seems, is still being applied today.

"Following the model of the Ohrid Agreement reached through the American-European Special Envoy with the consent of the UN, the process of resolving the final status of Kosovo should be led by two independent high-ranking envoys, one European and one American, with equal powers. These envoys will be responsible for proposing a solution for the final status based on broad consultations with interested parties in Pristina and Belgrade. They should be supported by a Security Council resolution that would grant them autonomy and provide basic rules (to exclude division, annexation to Albania, or Albanians living outside the borders of Kosovo, guarantees of territorial integrity, and protection of minority rights). If the Security Council refuses to give them the necessary mandate (due to the rejection of Russia and China, for example), the United States and the EU should appoint envoys to prepare for joint American-European solutions for Kosovo in consultations with interested parties", the report states.

The constructive role of Belgrade is desirable, but the chances for it are very slim, considering that the final status involves the independence of Kosovo. Negotiations involving Belgrade would be problematic and indefinitely delayed. Political leaders in Belgrade would be damaged if closely associated with an unpopular agreement. Therefore, the United Nations, EU, and the United States must be prepared to take the solution out of Belgrade's hands, and Kosovo becomes an independent fait accompli.

Since Belgrade will oppose, and this opposition may range from formal to violent, the international community must be ready to facilitate Belgrade's acceptance of the solution. "The international community should take into account factors that will perceive the solution as unfair and include a meeting strategy in its approach. Still, the international community must carefully present that Kosovo's independence is beneficial for all parties, and Serbia will be rewarded for its cooperation", the report states.

The report particularly elaborates on how to provide "political cover" for Belgrade politicians. This strategy involves two tracks.

In the first, the US, UN, and EU would guarantee full protection for the Serbs in Kosovo, as well as religious and cultural monuments. Those who remain outside Kosovo and do not return will be compensated, and this will be extended to other minorities. "The UN, EU, and the US can offer compensation to Serbia for the loss of territory in the form of economic aid. Writing off some of Serbia's international debts is one of the initiatives. Kosovo may also be obligated to assume a part of Serbia's debts", the document suggests.

The second area is the creation of options for cooperation. "Rewards should be given to Serbia for good behavior, including the promise by the EU for candidate status as early as 2006. The United States should help Serbia meet EU standards, supporting the current Feasibility Study and approving negotiations on the Association Agreement. This will simultaneously be an argument in favor of reformists before parliamentary elections in Serbia".

Although the authors of the report propose rewards for Serbian politicians in the event that Serbia "behaves well" in resolving the final status of Kosovo, they do not deserve special respect and high ratings from the report's authors. The report states that then-Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica was publicly "against reforms", and Tadic, "although his choice was welcomed by the West", had weak political support.

"Serbia's behavior in the last two years has been disappointing. Two years ago, Serbia was in the midst of a series of long-term reforms. Many of them have been stalled since March 2003 after the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic by elements connected to organized crime and official security structures. Although public support galvanized the determination to hold those responsible accountable, most of Djindjic's reforms were reversed. His successor, Vojislav Kostunica, although accepted as an ally of the West, made it clear that he was not a reformer. His government made progress in the economic field, achieving macroeconomic stability and freeing itself from external debts. He also tried to combat organized crime, but Kostunica systematically attempted to reverse the majority of Djindjic's reforms. In addition, he is a public opponent of Serbia's cooperation with the Hague Tribunal", the report sharply stated.

Only thanks to its progress in handing over numerous suspects to the Hague Tribunal, the European Union approved the start of negotiations on the Association Agreement, according to the report. In addition to this, it is noted that the most significant obstacle to political progress, apart from the unresolved issue of Kosovo, is the large and unreformed security sector that had a powerful influence on the Serbian state during Milosevic's years.

"Military services, as well as state security, are linked to ultranationalist politics and war crimes committed during Milosevic's time, and they are connected to organized crime. They institutionally oppose cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and reforms aimed at eradicating corruption and strengthening the rule of law", the report states.

The recommendation is that the United States should focus on reforms and a principled policy of cooperation with The Hague, which will accelerate Serbia's integration into the EU.

"Reaching this goal requires significant efforts to marginalize obstructionist groups in the army and intelligence service. While continuing to exert pressure for the arrest of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, America can acknowledge and reward the current progress by providing more assistance to the army of Serbia and Montenegro, but at a low level, such as training junior officers in the United States and exchanging mid-level officers", the report emphasizes.

The authors of the report criticized the then US administration for placing the Balkans very low on its list of foreign policy priorities, "even though the region continues to significantly impact US interests, and the situation in the region has become even more dangerous than in 2002". The report acknowledges that it is justified to shift responsibility to the European Union, but there are signs that "some individuals want to completely hand over responsibility to the European Union". This approach is concluded to "harm US-European relations", but more importantly, "US interests in the region".

All in all, it is evident that a crystal ball is not needed to predict the future. It is enough to assume that you have the ability to try to shape it.