What will the security situation be like in Kosovo in 2024, and what does it depend on the most?

"When it comes to organized violence, the greatest risk factor is the Kosovo special police, which exercises de facto control over northern Kosovo. Simultaneously, Kosovo has never achieved a proper culture of accountability for individual violence against members of non-majority communities, so for any breaches of security during 2024, exclusive responsibility will rest with the Kosovo and international forces".

Edited by: Milos Garic

The challenges regarding the security of the Serbian population in Kosovo will mark the upcoming year 2024, as indicated by everything that has happened in the past year, along with the recent statements of representatives of the authorities in Pristina and the general polarization and escalation of relations on the global scene.

Kosovo's Minister of Defense, Ejup Maqedonci, stated a few days ago that members of the KSF had the mandate to operate throughout the territory of Kosovo, and 'when it is necessary to intervene in operations in the north, they will be there'. This is a rather concerning statement, especially considering the already heightened Serbian-Albanian relations to the maximum, the abolition of basic civil rights of the Serbs, and the massive presence of police special forces in the north, in municipalities with an absolute Serb majority.

The complexity of the security situation in Kosovo is further intensified by the continued delay in the normalization process between Belgrade and Pristina, and the diametrically opposed positions will be even more challenging to reconcile in the year that brings important elections within the EU and the presidential race in the USA, which will further distract the attention and promptness of Western intermediaries.

Interlocutors of Kosovo Online, who are well acquainted with the situation in Kosovo, as well as key external factors, warn of potential danger and the very likely development of additional instability in the coming year.

Political analyst Ognjen Gogic points out that the issue of security in Kosovo, especially the vulnerability of members of non-majority communities, is always an open and current question.

Organized police violence

"Kosovo has not achieved an adequate level of security culture, for which both local and international institutions and organizations bear responsibility. Therefore, as we approach each new year, there must be an assumption that security situations may be compromised. Security risks in Kosovo are diverse. However, it is necessary to distinguish between two basic levels of security threats. On the one hand, there are organized and institutional forms of compromising security, while, on the other hand, one can also talk about individual violent behavior", Gogic notes.

Geographically, he emphasizes, the greatest danger of widespread violence still exists in northern Kosovo.

"When it comes to organized violence, the greatest risk factor is the Kosovo special police. Northern Kosovo remains under the de facto control of the special police. Its members have shown inappropriate behavior bordering on police brutality over the past two years, causing significant unrest among the local population. Meanwhile, steps have not been taken to build trust and establish dialogue between the police and the local population, and mechanisms for reporting and taking action on the exceeding of powers by police officers have not been developed. If the excessive presence of special police in northern Kosovo is maintained in 2024, as is likely to be the case, then security will primarily depend on the professionalism of their work and communication with the local population", Gogic warns.

Significant roles in this can be played by international missions, KFOR, and EULEX, which should demonstrate that they represent a guarantee of security for all.

"KFOR is especially expected to restrain the Kosovo Security Forces, whose legality is inherently questionable. After the attack in Banjska and the actions taken in connection with it in northern Kosovo, it seems that there are no more radical groups on the Serbian side that could participate in escalating tensions and provoking conflicts. In this sense, for any breach of security in northern Kosovo during 2024, Kosovo and international forces will bear exclusive responsibility. Events in Serbian communities in Kosovo are often, understandably, in focus of the Serbian public. However, it should not be overlooked that within Albanian communities, various criminal and other groups are settling scores with each other. Another potential for violence comes from returnees from foreign battlefields as radicalized followers of Islamist militant groups. This issue will become more relevant in light of the Jewish-Arab conflict", Gogic says.

Pre-election campaign poses an additional risk

The second form of violence, particularly concerning for the Serbian community, involves individual acts of violence.

"In Kosovo, an adequate culture of accountability for violence against members of non-majority communities has never been achieved. In recent years, numerous cases of endangering the physical safety and property of the Serb and other community members have been documented. Some of these incidents are motivated by ethnic intolerance, while in others, the existence of an ethnic dimension must be assumed. Namely, the Serbs in Kosovo are an easy target. Even criminals whose primary motive is to gain some material benefit are more likely to choose to break into a Serbian rather than an Albanian house. The reason for this lies in their belief that they will more easily 'get away with it' if they steal from the Serbs rather than the Albanians. Responsibility for such a state of affairs lies with the judicial and other institutions that have not shown agility in prosecuting crimes whose victims are Serbs. This is systemic discrimination deeply rooted in Kosovo institutions, to which international actors are blind", analyst Gogic emphasizes.

In addition to frequent robberies and thefts, more severe forms of physical attacks driven by hostility also occur in Kosovo.

"For such attacks, it could be assumed that they are more a result of the autonomous actions of thugs and extremists than politically orchestrated. They happen spontaneously without a clear background. The problem is that there is no accountability for such acts in Kosovo. The solution involves harsher penalties for perpetrators of hate attacks, as well as a change in the political climate and rhetoric of the ruling class in Kosovo, which turns the Serbs into scapegoats. In this regard, there are no indications that anything significant will improve during 2024", Gogic points out.

He concludes that it should be kept in mind that 2024 is an election year for Kosovo, with parliamentary elections expected in early 2025, followed by local elections. The pre-election campaign will exacerbate divisions and raise the level of tension in society, which will likely affect the overall security situation.

Darko Obradovic, the Program Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis, explains that the security situation in Kosovo can be viewed through the lens of national and human security.

Institutional terror against the Serbs

"In terms of national security, Kosovo remains the number one challenge for Serbia, and such a situation carries a great potential for the emergence of crises. Fundamentally, the unresolved status of Kosovo cannot conventionally jeopardize the security of Serbia, and the conditions for armed clashes are prevented by Serbia's strategic commitment and the presence of NATO forces. However, the risk lies in non-armed threats such as economic and political isolation of the state. Pristina's efforts to diminish Serbia's foreign policy capacity are clear, eliminating the last obstacle to the protection of the Serbs and cultural heritage", Obradovic notes.

He points out that for two years now, Pristina has been hoping "that Serbia will worsen its relations with the EU and NATO".

"The core security challenge is human, or social, security of Kosovo Serbs. Their position is complicated due to institutional and administrative terror that takes the initiative in achieving a political solution in the form of normalization of relations. In the existence of this distance between the right to the survival of the Serbs and the political solution of normalization of relations, dangerous and destructive intentions of Albin Kurti are found. In this regard, it is realistic to expect acts of terror aimed at reducing the number of ethnic Serbs, and their displacement, and reshaping the demographic picture of the population in ethnically Serbian communities. At the same time, in security terms, preparations should be made to fight for religious and cultural heritage because Kosovo Albanians aim to resolve this issue before a comprehensive agreement on the normalization of relations", Obradovic warns.

According to him, Pristina can resort to escalation in the hope of internationally disqualifying Serbia.

"The security situation is unfavorable and unpredictable for Kosovo Serbs. It will remain so until the institutionalization of the Serbs under the auspices of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. The formation of the Community and its implementation is precisely the trigger for security destabilization, as witnessed in the previous period by a series of political-security crises. The full responsibility is on the KFOR mission to ensure the physical security of the Serbs. Violent extremism is an additional factor that adversely affects the Serbs, and the number of ethnically motivated attacks is not decreasing. Today, it is more than clear that Kurti sees the Serbs as intruders in his own land and is not willing to make any concessions unless he secures candidate status for NATO membership or progress on the EU path. Without the pretext of the Kosovo and the Serbs being endangered as the perennial culprits in the policy of the need for a 'Greater Albania', Kurti's project, loses significance in the 21st century. Manageability of these challenges can be achieved through more active security cooperation of Serbia in the collective security system, presenting Kurti as the sole disruptor on the ground, and Serbia as a factor of regional security and a reliable partner with transparent intentions", Darko Obradovic concludes.