Tied trade

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic, a journalist

My uncle, when he was still a sales assistant, was taught by older and experienced merchants that when a customer buys coffee, he must also offer sugar. If he takes sugar, he can also offer him Turkish Delight. There are, quite simply, such customers that someone needs to remind of what they cannot remember that is missing from their closet and which is good for both them and the merchant.

Later, the whole system was perfected and became known as "tied trade". In it, things that are normally joined by their nature do not come together. Things that were incompatible even by nature came together. Let's say a customer buys a coffee, and then the salesperson sells her some more nails. It was a trade that was developed to the detriment of buyers, tyrannical and unethical, based on a relationship of power in which the buyer is in a weaker position than the seller and in which the sellers want to maximize both profits. All this, however, does not absolve the buyer from responsibility. That's when the problem, which is actually a universal life problem, and not just a commercial one, began to arise when the "golden rule" is broken, that problems in life begin when you buy what you don't need and sell what you don't have.

Almost the same rules apply in diplomatic negotiations. If you find yourself in a disadvantageous position, then the mediators, usually the big powers, will try to simultaneously pack as many issues as possible, into the "tied trade", that are related to the main problem. Thus, for example, during the Dayton negotiations, Milosevic was simultaneously offered to negotiate and sign an agreement on Kosovo.

At this moment, when the "dialogue" on the Franco-German document seems to be a clear priority, other issues appear in the background and are proposed as candidates for simultaneous removal from the "pending" list. In the beginning, it was assumed that Serbia should allow Kosovo to become a member of the UN, that sanctions be imposed on Russia, and that Serbia should recognize Kosovo. In the meantime, it was realized that the goals set in this way were too ambitious and that they could not be achieved without an upheaval in Serbia itself and its eventual destabilization, so the recognition was omitted at this time, with the fact that it was clearly presented that this was the next step in some foreseeable time when the question of Serbia's entry into the European Union was raised. There are still two issues that are connected, sometimes behind each other, sometimes in parallel, in the current talks - the permission for Kosovo to become a member of international organizations and the introduction of sanctions against Russia.

But already in this appearance, it is clear that these are two questions that, at first glance, have nothing to do with each other. Kosovo has been on the agenda since 1999 when its status was determined by the UNSC Resolution 1244, while sanctions against Russia were introduced since 2014, but Serbia has never had to declare itself against them, although there have been calls here and there that Serbia should harmonize with EU policy. Sanctions against Russia were never an integral part of the EU "Kosovo policy", but now it seems as if they are necessarily related issues.

The truth is that Serbia's sanctions against Russia have intensively appeared as an EU request since February 24, 2022, when the Russian military operation against Ukraine began, and they preceded the appearance of the German, and then the Franco-German document on the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo by several months. Now the document and sanctions have become "related parties", i.e. "tied trade", so topics from one issue easily move to another. The public in Serbia is almost unanimous when it comes to opposition to sanctions against Russia. All publicly presented surveys show that about 80 percent of respondents are against the introduction of sanctions against Russia, and over 50 percent even if there were some EU sanctions against Serbia. This is an important factor for anyone who intends to do something against this atmosphere.

The Minister of Economy of Serbia, Rade Basta, has not been seen at the Business Forum on Kopaonik yet, but the Kremlin has already heard about him, if not the whole planet. Basta asked that sanctions be imposed on Russia because "our country is paying a high price for not imposing sanctions and it is becoming unsustainable." His call came a day after Miroslav Lajcak visited Belgrade. So far, the European envoy has not commented on the sanctions against Russia. In his last tour, it was announced that Lajcak would discuss the preparations for the meeting in Ohrid on March 18, when the Agreement Implementation Plan should be adopted, and the modalities and the beginning of the formation of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. According to reports, the European Union would like the two parties to sign something by March 24, when the European Council was held in Brussels, and the only document that was a candidate was the Agreement Implementation Plan. Sanctions in this context have not been mentioned publicly yet, but that does not mean that they were not discussed at the meetings that were held or that the issue will not be raised in Ohrid.

The US Ambassador, Christopher Hill, who tries to be encouraging when it comes to imposing sanctions on Russia, a few days ago corrected the wording that had been reported in the media that Serbia "must" impose sanctions on Russia. "I never used the word "must"; what I propose, bearing in mind that Serbia is on the European path and that Serbia will get there sooner or later, is that it is necessary to align with EU policy and if necessary, to swallow some bitter pill -  to do it now," Ambassador Hill said.

In any case, the issue has upset the Kremlin. The Kremlin, through Dmitry Peskov, expressed the expectation that “we would resolve the most problematic issues within the framework of a confidential partnership dialogue with our Serbian friends", while Maria Zakharova said, "Some strange attitude - America is putting pressure on Serbia, and the Serbian minister is calling for action against Russia. Perhaps the Serbian minister should speak out strongly against the pressure on his country?" Maria Zakharova wrote.

This shows that Kosovo or the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina are not issues that per se interest the great powers, but that they are there because of much more global politics and deeper needs.

The esteemed American daily "Christian Science Monitor" can help us, which a few days ago published an editorial comment under the title "Victory against Russia - but outside of Ukraine". In the commentary, the main "character" is Serbia. The acceptance of the Franco-German plan by Serbia and Kosovo is taken as an example of European success in curbing the "ethnic nationalism" that is now leading Russia in its war against Ukraine. "If implemented, the plan would give a blow to Russia's attempts to control countries in Europe with a Slavic or Orthodox Christian population such as Serbia," the daily pointed out.

The commentary quotes the views of Zorana Mihajovic, Gabriel Escobar, and Aleksandar Vucic in favor of this agreement. "Such a search for democratic consensus does not sound like the aggressive nationalism of Serbia's past." The battlefield against Russia's war with Ukraine is not only in Ukraine," the Christian Science Monitor concludes.

This expansion of the "battlefield against Russia to Serbia" is based on the fact that the fight against Russia is global; it is being fought on every inch of the planet, and in Serbia in particular. Since it is quite clear that this is difficult to achieve in today's world, then the bloc against Russia is trying to firmly build itself in the "Western Hemisphere", as it was defined in the era of the Monroe Doctrine. The opposition and the fight against Russia in this sense have fundamental importance for the "Western Hemisphere". The Serbian introduction of any, even the most innocuous, sanctions against Russia would mean only Serbia's first step into the "Western Hemisphere". The European Union has so far accepted 10 packages of sanctions, and that would be the maximum that Serbia could apply against Russia. Serbia may not be counted on to the full extent, but Serbia was clearly told that there would be no opening of new clusters until Serbia imposed sanctions on Russia. The European Parliament has repeatedly adopted resolutions that had an identical message.

Therefore, the "tied trade" of sanctions and agreements also has delicate moments that can easily be overlooked, until the need arises to use them to their full potential. For example, it is not clear whether there is a relationship between sanctions and military participation in confronting Russia in Ukraine. We can guess that NATO's new strategic plans also have a place for Kosovo, and in order for them to be realized, Kosovo should somehow qualify to become a member of NATO, even though it is not a state in the true sense, and the normalization of relations is important in this sense as well.

The adopted sanctions packages of the European Union have a large number of security and military aspects that intersect with the measures undertaken by NATO, since now almost all EU members, except Austria, are NATO members or have requested membership, so let's mention whether this would have any importance for Serbia.

A significant part of Serbia's military equipment is compatible with the weapons that Ukraine and Russia have, and in this case, it would be somewhat natural that Serbia would be expected to strengthen Ukraine's combat capabilities, in a similar way as it is requested to join the EU sanctions, although it is not a member of the EU. It would be another test for Serbia. It would be important for it to then ask itself whether it is buying what it does not need or selling what does not have.