The German plan changes the existential matrix of Serbia

During the last weeks, the diplomatic initiative was strengthened as part of the efforts of the European Union and the United States to intensify the dialogue between the two sides and promote the integration process. All of a sudden, it seems that optimism, helpfulness, and friendliness have shone a light on the Kosovo issue. Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti finally announced that he had accepted the German plan for the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina because otherwise, Kosovo would "confront its allies".

This was accepted with great relief by the proponents of the plan because it means that the talks will not be delayed due to a possible change of government or new elections in Kosovo. Of course, all the reservations about the CSM remained, from the new assessment that it was about "apartheid", to the paper which predicts that the implementation of the CSM will only begin two weeks after the signing of the agreement between Serbia and Pristina.

The winter idyll, as things stand, so far without snow, was supplemented by news from Munich from the general meeting of the western "military-industrial complex". The highest European and American officials - Chancellor Scholz, President Macron, and State Secretary Blinken, who are participating in the meeting, met in different formats with the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, and Albin Kurti. Only the president of Serbia met with all three, while Kurti met with Scholz and the French foreign minister, while Blinken continued the characteristically reserved American attitude towards Kosovo officials for this stage, so he did not meet with either Kurti or Vjosa Osmani.

The details of the conversation were not disclosed, but it seems logical that they concerned the upcoming meeting in Brussels, which was discussed by the European representative for foreign policy, Josep Borrell. He met with his Balkan interlocutors and announced a "high-level" dialogue on February 27 in Brussels. Serbia had been told that it was expected to certainly accept the proposed document, but also to impose sanctions on Russia. Those two things were crucial for Serbia's progress towards the EU, Borell said. These talks probably helped the President of Serbia to announce that Serbia is "strongly reproached" for not imposing sanctions on Russia.

In Serbia, these diplomatic efforts are reflected as a new fatal choice between West and East, progress and regression, democracy and autocracy. But numerous complex international cases provide a wide range of examples in international negotiations that can show that many countries have found themselves in similar situations.

In the second half of the 20th century, the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel in 1978, as well as what preceded them and what followed them, were the most distinctive in terms of complexity and difficulty. They set numerous useful analogies for Serbia with the issue of Kosovo.

In a preventive strike in 1967, Israel conquered the entire Egyptian Sinai, a key peninsula for Egypt's security. We are talking about the territory in the east of the country with an area as large as Serbia. Egyptian President Nasser, after the persuasion of Yugoslav President Tito, who was staying in the Middle East for two weeks, gave up his resignation and announced that the Sinai would be returned by war within 5 years. Nasser dies suddenly and is replaced by Vice President Anwar El Sadat, who until then was in charge of coordinating cooperation with the USSR, Egypt's closest ally.

Realizing that the US is the only superpower in the world, "to keep the USSR in its pocket", Sadat decides to change allies and go to the American side. He orders all 30,000 Soviet advisers to leave the country, while he establishes communications with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and negotiates the price of his turnaround. And the price is the return of Sinai.

In order for Israel, which does not want to give up this valuable acquisition at any cost, to be persuaded to do so, Sadat started the "Yom Kippur War" half a century ago on October 6, 1973. The goal of this war is not the conquest of Sinai and its return to Egypt. The goal, as Sadat said, is to "conquer at least 10 meters", and to return the peninsula in negotiations, which happened. But Egypt has the US behind it, as does Israel, but the moral and legal right is on its side.

In order for Israel to have satisfaction, the formula "land for peace" is offered to it. This means, Israel regains territory but gains peace with the first Arab country that recognizes it and establishes diplomatic relations. Today, this resulted in the "Abraham Accords" signed in 2020, in which five more Arab states recognized Israel.

The negotiators demonstrated their abilities and a fiery determination; they knew how to balance on the very edge, waiting for their final concession, until everyone else would put their cards on the table. Israel had to cede all of Sinai to Sadat, thus giving something very tangible. But, in return, Israel received not only peace with Egypt, which by its nature did not have to prove so long-lasting but also a free hand in the West Bank and Gaza. For Israel, Sinai was sacrificed, but "Eretz Israel" was gained.

Israel protected itself from American and Egyptian pressure on the other side, on the key issue of the future of the West Bank and Gaza and any kind of connection between the Egyptian-Israel agreement and the Palestinian issue. Israel thus got a free hand in the Palestinian territories. Although it has promised "full autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza, Israel has refused to specify what that means in practice. He did not agree to abolish the military administration, but only to "withdraw" it. Later discussions revealed that he wanted to physically move the military administration out of the West Bank for an interim period, but it would continue to exist and have ultimate control over "self-governing bodies" that the Palestinians were to elect.

In moments of infinite trust in American President Carter, Sadat generously let the American president decide on behalf of Egypt "knowing that it will be a decision in Egypt's best interest." Carter accepted that the US would be the guarantor of the agreement, and for 45 years, the Egyptian army has been receiving unquestionable and irreversible aid of 1.3 billion dollars per year to maintain and guarantee this agreement.

If this situation were to be transferred to the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, the most important question would be who is Egypt and who is Israel, in order to reach an answer to the essential question of all negotiations - who gets what? In many respects, it could be said that Serbia's position was similar to Egypt's: Kosovo would be a modern Sinai, a close alliance with Russia that is expected to be abandoned, and Serbia to join the Western countries. State Secretary Blinken, in his congratulations on the occasion of the Statehood Day, announced that the "reward for the Serbian people" would be "enormous" if it made "difficult compromises".

But, unlike Egypt, it would not be rewarded with the return of "Sinai", ie. of Kosovo, but quite the opposite, with the surrender of Sinai.

Serbia would not even be eligible for a prize in the "land for peace" formula.

Kosovo would get land and peace, and Serbia, by all accounts, would get what was left of both after that. The vague and nebulous presentation of the gains from reaching the agreement makes its acceptance in Serbia difficult, but that is not the only difficulty.

The dialogue in Brussels, at least from Serbia's point of view, cannot be exempted from consideration of its meaning in a wider, regional context, since accepting the German paper would fundamentally change Serbia's regional position and affect its security.

This agreement is not a document that has consequences only for the relations between Belgrade and Pristina, because its intentions fundamentally change the existential matrix of Serbia, and in that sense, it should be considered. Especially since it can be signed only once, irreversibly, and after that, there will be no other opportunity to be revoked.

Written by: Dragan Bisenic, journalist