Timothy Less: A deal is possible on the exchange of territories of Kosovo and Republic of Srpska

Professor of the Center for Geopolitics of the University of Cambridge, Timothy Less, points out that he is skeptical about the agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, stating that the agreement offered by the European Union looks quite bad from Serbia's point of view, Blic reports.

"Why would Serbia admit the loss of Kosovo when there is little obvious benefit? The carrot of EU membership is largely a dead letter," Less says in an interview for Blic.

He points out that, like the Albanians, Serbia also has at its disposal an alternative that suits it much better.

"Keeping Kosovo in a state of frozen conflict, waiting for a moment in the future when it can extract better terms, including the annexation of the north and perhaps an exchange of territories between the rest of Kosovo and Republika Srpska," Less says.

After dozens of failed attempts, Kosovo was approved to start the procedure for joining the Council of Europe. How do you look at it?

It is a significant step towards the consolidation of Kosovo's independence because it seems that Kosovo will be accepted into an international organization that is reserved for states. However, it is also an obstacle to EU-led dialogue. The Serbs see the decision as a reward for intransigence and evidence of international bias against them, leaving them cynical about negotiations. Albanians see Serbia's opposition in the Council of Europe as proof that Belgrade is not committed to the agreement, and especially Kosovo's right to join international organizations, leaving them wondering why Kosovo should make concessions to Serbia on the issue of autonomy for the Serbs.

Greece made a concession and Slovakia abstained, which is unusual, considering that they do not recognize Kosovo. Do you think that their opinion about the independence of Kosovo is changing?

To some extent, yes. While earlier Greece and Slovakia opposed the independence of Kosovo, now they are apparently more neutral on the issue. Therefore, it is a significant development and reflects various factors - their need for good relations with the US and their European counterparts, concern about Russian influence in the Balkans, and acceptance that Kosovo's independence from Serbia is a fait accompli. However, their positions remain nuanced and complex, perhaps even more so in the current international environment where borders are increasingly challenged. Greece cannot accept the precedent legitimizing the independence of Northern Cyprus, and Slovakia is increasingly concerned about Hungarian irredentism, which means that both still have a strong interest in promoting the norm of territorial integrity of states. It is worth mentioning that Slovakia is moving towards a change of government after the elections in September, which will probably return the pro-Russian party “Direction" to power and, with it, bring changes in the country's foreign and regional policy.

You mentioned Russia and borders. Ukraine, for example, was restrained?

The attitude of Ukraine is dictated above all by the imperative of war. It is clear that Kyiv has a critical interest in promoting the norm of territorial integrity. However, it also needs the support of the US, UK, and other European powers to win the war and currently has no sympathy for Serbia for its refusal to sanction Russia. What we are witnessing is a reflection of the conflict of interests, which is expressed in the form of restraint.

The elections in the north of Kosovo are behind us, which can have far-reaching consequences. Do the elected mayors have legitimacy, considering the circumstances under which they were held and the fact that in the north about three percent of citizens participated in the elections?

With only 3.5 percent of the votes, the new mayors clearly lack a democratic mandate or any real power over the local population. In this respect, although Pristina may have replaced disloyal Serbian mayors with new, loyal, Albanian ones, it is a Pyrrhic victory that will encourage even greater alienation from Kosovo's institutions. It is hard to imagine the Serbs in the north paying taxes to finance them, and the logical next step for the Serbs would be to re-establish parallel institutions of government.

Then, repeating the choice seems like an inevitable step. Do you think that will happen in the next period?

Probably not, at least until the Serbs agree to participate in the election process, which for the time being requires the establishment of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities.

Some analysts estimate that the Council of Europe and visa liberalization are the calculation by which the EU and the US ask Kurti to establish the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. Are they right?

I don't know exactly what deals were made behind the scenes, but I'm sure all these problems are connected. European governments are afraid of spillover from Ukraine to the Balkans. They want to neutralize Russian influence in Serbia, which means solving the Kosovo issue. From the perspective of Europeans, this means convincing Serbia to recognize Kosovo, for which the assumed precondition is that Kosovo grants autonomy to the Serbs. And that means softening the public in Kosovo by giving them a pre-paid reward for their cooperation.

Serbia has been waiting for a decade for the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities, a month has passed since the agreement in Ohrid, but Kurti has not started that process. Do you believe that the EU, and especially the US, have no way to convince Kurti to do what Pristina has committed to?

Maybe. The US and the EU have the means to influence Kosovo. They offered carrots, but they also have sticks - withholding aid, changing the government, etc. For its part, Kosovo knows that it needs the support of external actors to achieve independence, so the US and the EU still have leverage. The problem is that, from the perspective of Albanians, the EU deal looks pretty bad. They are being asked to establish an autonomous unit for the north that will formalize its separation from the rest of Kosovo, something they clearly do not want to do, and without any reciprocal demand that Serbia recognize Kosovo beyond a vague and open commitment to "comprehensive normalization of relations" once they have established the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. At the same time, there is an alternative that is probably still available and that suits them much better, which is to bypass Serbia's refusal to recognize Kosovo by seeking membership in international organizations such as the EU and NATO and demanding that the West put pressure on Serbia. If the US and the EU are against it today, Albanians can always wait until new, more lenient governments are elected.

Is a compromise in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina even possible, the next meeting is on May 2?

I'm skeptical, partly for the reasons I just described. But of course, the EU deal also looks pretty bad from Serbia's point of view. Why would it admit the loss of Kosovo when there is little obvious benefit? The carrot of EU membership is largely a dead letter. Like the Albanians, Serbia also has at its disposal an alternative that suits it much better - that is, maintaining Kosovo in a state of frozen conflict, waiting for a moment in the future when it can extract better terms, including the annexation of the north and perhaps an exchange of territories between the rest of Kosovo and Republika Srpska.

More optimistic are US officials, including Gabriel Escobar, who say that an agreement could be reached by the end of this year. Do you share his opinion?

Escobar's forecast could be credible in a scenario in which - the two sides were strongly committed to reaching an agreement; there was agreement on the main elements and a willingness to compromise on second-order issues, and the political relationship between Belgrade and Pristina was friendly and productive, and public opinion on both sides supported the deal. However, none of these factors apply in the case of Serbia and Kosovo, and the idea that an agreement can be reached this year - if ever - has little basis in reality.

Kosovo is not the only "hot" topic. Do you think that the "storm" could spread to the Balkans, due to the growing tension in Bosnia and the announcement of the separation of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Yes, I think that is a likely scenario. Bosnia, of course, has its own politics, and the latest Serb challenges to the Bosnian state are partly a reflection of local developments - specifically, Sarajevo's right to public property in Republika Srpska. However, the Serbs are also looking directly at the developments in Kosovo because they believe their best hope for secession from Bosnia is a grand bargain in which the US agrees to a territory excange between Republika Srpska and Kosovo. What they can see is that the US is determined to resolve the Kosovo issue and that Donald Trump plans to run for president in 2024, potentially bringing to power a person who would accept such a deal. And to prevent that from happening, the wider environment is increasingly enabling the independence of Republika Srpska. Border changes are in the power of the great powers and, as competition between the US, Russia, and China intensifies, existing borders are increasingly fragile. We have already witnessed Russian border disputes in Ukraine, and only this week Beijing's ambassador in Paris made it clear that China did not accept the existing territorial order in Europe defined by America. As the US tries to co-opt Eastern Europeans into its anti-China alliance, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which China retaliates by supporting the Serbs - and perhaps other disaffected groups such as the Hungarians - in an effort to bring them into its own alliance.