The lessons of Kosovo: Why Gaza needs more than a protectorate
Without offering a political resolution to the conflict, the roadmap unveiled in Washington on Tuesday will not bring lasting stability to the region.
There is no longer any time for hesitation in stopping the abysmal slaughter of the Palestinian population and securing the release of Israeli hostages. To this end, the plan put forward by Donald Trump must be subject to serious and urgent consideration.
But let us be clear: Without offering a political resolution to the conflict, the roadmap unveiled in Washington on Tuesday will not bring lasting stability to the region.
After the reconstruction of Gaza, and if the Palestinian Authority were to reform itself, „the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood“ Trump argued. This idea was dismissed just minutes later by Benjamin Netanyahu.
And setting aside the Israeli Prime Minister’s motivations to push against Palestinian self-determination, it should be noted that conditional promises generally bind only those who are compelled to believe them. History offers a sobering precedent.
On 10 June 1999, United Nations Resolution 1244 authorised the deployment of NATO forces to Kosovo, ending the war between Albanian UÇK fighters and Serbian security forces. But it also reaffirmed the territorial integrity of what remained of Yugoslavia, then comprising Montenegro and Serbia.
The resolution established a wide-ranging Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK), empowered to oversee policing, justice, health, education, and more, effectively creating a civilian governance structure for what was still legally an “autonomous province“ of Serbia.
On the ground, Serbian troops gave way to NATO soldiers and tens of thousands of international officials poured into Pristina to replace Belgrade’s administration.
It was a plan destined to breed resentment: Serbia was stripped of one of its regions while still being recognised as its sovereign, and the Albanians were rid of Serbian authority but deprived of any legal pathway to independence.
The guerrilla leaders who had seized power in Pristina quickly grasped that only armed struggle could shift the status quo. By 2001 they were exporting violence to Albanian areas of northern Macedonia and southern Serbia, and by 2004 launching a wave of attacks against Serbian enclaves in Kosovo.
The West had no appetite for further war and feared that the „Balkan powder keg“ might ignite once more. Independence was therefore proclaimed unilaterally in Pristina on 17 February 2008. It was swiftly recognised by many Western capitals but not by Russia. Not surprisingly, Serbia also rejected Kosovan independence and to this day clings to the provisions of the 1999 resolution.
The point here is not to revisit the legitimacy of recognising a Palestinian state, nor to reopen the debate on Kosovo’s independence. It is rather to highlight a lesson already taught: International protectorates, when not anchored in clear political objectives accepted by all parties, and when not bound by strict time limits, are never a sound foundation for peace.
Written by Laurent Geslin, the chief editor of the French office of Euractiv
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