Temporary victories without a podium and gold medals

Writing for Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic

Albanians have reasons for triumphalism. It is expressed in various ways – from satisfaction that Kosovo is the most successful American project of "state-building" to enthusiastic reactions to the election of Talat Xhaferi as the Prime Minister of North Macedonia. Indeed, almost everything significant that has happened in Southeast Europe in the last two decades has been overshadowed by the undeniable Albanian expansion. Little has not succeeded for the Albanian national corpus in this regard. The NATO intervention in 1999 ended with the expulsion of Serbian institutions from Kosovo and almost all Serbs south of the Ibar River. In 2001, there was a rebellion in Macedonia, which then ended with significant concessions that practically brought constitutional and state constitutiveness. Kosovo has been on the path to independence since 2003, recognized by the United States in 2008, followed by other NATO members, the EU, and their then-allied and sympathetic countries. In the first wave, Kosovo was recognized or prepared to be recognized by more than 100 countries.

The changes brought about by the "Arab Spring" and the somewhat later rise of the Islamic State led many countries to reconsider the use of military force by third countries in the fragmentation of states and the creation of new borders differently and more maturely. As a result of this process, a significant number of states revised their initial decisions and embarked on a reverse trend of firmly defending guarantees of territorial sovereignty and integrity. It was a time of losing and consolidating arguments that were the foundation of confidence in Kosovo's statehood. Kosovo then found itself on the side of radical currents in the Arab world, undermining its arguments and leaving almost irreparable traces. After that, a turning point occurred that continues today and is exclusively linked to the "Western hemisphere".

After February 24, 2022, and the Russian attack on Ukraine, the "anti-Russian phase" of the Albanian factor's expansion in the Balkans ensued. Russia was completely excluded from Europe and, to some extent, withdrew from European institutions. This brought European policy to the option of "Russia out – Kosovo in". Since then, the "Albanian factor" has been seen as a component of the "anti-Russian front", leading to a kind of revival of the "small solution" policy for Kosovo. This would involve its recognition as a state by all EU and NATO member states, with Serbia retaining its place in international institutions. Although Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia are firmly against Russia, the Serbian stance currently holds the majority in almost all bodies where Kosovo is not a member. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that Serbia does not interpret its stance as "de facto" Serbian acceptance of Kosovo's independence.

A part of this wave is the election of Talat Xhaferi as the interim Prime Minister of North Macedonia. Xhaferi's appointment as the Prime Minister of North Macedonia has been strongly marked and welcomed in all Albanian regions, no less than as a "historic event". While it is a sign of Albanian emancipation and full integration into the political institutions of North Macedonia, it cannot be called a "historical precedent".

Albanians were also in top state positions in the former Yugoslavia, both in Macedonia and Serbia. It was a different time and under different circumstances, but if we talk about the national affirmation of Albanians, we should start from its beginnings. It is worth noting that Dritan Abazovic became the Prime Minister of Montenegro long before Xhaferi, but his appointment did not generate as much enthusiasm in the Albanian public, excluding comments from Edi Rama. "Who could have believed until yesterday that the Balkans, with six countries, would have three Albanian prime ministers? It is up to us to try to build new bridges for peace and prosperity for all of us," Ra wrote ma. The Prime Minister of Kosovo showed much less enthusiasm, sending only one sentence.

Xhaferi's election is described as an "extraordinary development for Albanians, breaking the stronghold of ethnic monopoly and cooperation with a view to a common future". Similarly, the "democratic transformation of North Macedonia is closely linked to the role and contribution of Albanians as a nation-building community, who have long been marginalized". Commentators in Albania emphasize the importance of the Ohrid Agreement and highlight NATO's role as its guarantor, conditioning North Macedonia's membership on its adherence. It is emphasized that the inclusion of the Ohrid Agreement as a criterion was insisted upon by Albania, pointing to who the real "homeland" and the main center of all Albanians is, as currently only Albania has genuine state legal subjectivity, which is not the case for Kosovo or Albanians in North Macedonia.

"For Albania, the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement was primarily a question of security, interethnic understanding, and democratic stability with an impact on the entire region. For this reason, thanks to our insistence, its full implementation was included as a criterion for North Macedonia's NATO membership in the summit document in Wales in 2014. Although we were internally criticized for allegedly obstructing our neighbors on their Euro-Atlantic path, and not all NATO allies understood our position, time has shown that we were right". In the end, key credits for Euro-Atlantic integrations are attributed to Albania, while those who opposed Albania's interference in the internal affairs of North (then SR) Macedonia have been proven "wrong". "Thanks to wise political action, Albanians have proven to be the cornerstone of democratic stability and have dictated North Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic path".

There are also those with a different mood. They point out that Albanians are still unequal to the "Slavo-Macedonians" and that it is all just an illusion of equality. "Albanians have the illusion that they are equal to Slavo-Macedonians! This is a historical concept that belongs to them because we all know, even they themselves, have no connection with Macedonians! In fact, if we study history well, the only ones related to ancient Macedonians are precisely the Albanians! Formally, Albanians have secured many of their legitimate rights! However, the significant inequality of Albanians is not at the constitutional or institutional level but at the structural and social level," some commentators from Albania state.

What should be noted at this point is that the experience from numerous Balkan conflicts shows that a temporary and passing feeling of victory may be allowed, but no one will climb onto the winner's podium to receive a gold medal. This was the case with Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks, and most likely it will be the same for Albanians. In ethnic terms, Albanians have a consolidated space, and from that perspective, it seems like everything is ready for "Greater Albania". However, political life and political processes often take different paths with different logic.

When discussing the future of Albanians, or entities that possess attributes of statehood, currently represented only by Albania, and where these attributes are being verified and valorized, it turned out that the recognition of Kosovo by the West is not enough for true statehood, Albanians themselves probably do not think about "two Germanys" as European and US envoys portray it, but rather about a "united Albania" that did not have to go through the phase of "German history". However, perhaps the "two Germanys" model will still be what awaits Albania and Kosovo?

This would mean the existence of two centers of political power within the Albanian corpus. If Kosovo becomes a NATO member, then NATO will seek to stabilize relations between Pristina and Tirana, as is the case in North Macedonia. However, it will be an entirely new situation for NATO, where it will have to manage internal relations within the same nation. East and West Germany not only were not members of the same military alliance but also had difficult and openly hostile relations. These two states naturally lead to formulating different goals, where competition is much more likely than cooperation.

It has long been believed that states with liberal and democratic systems do not go to war with each other. For US policy, this is a necessary premise for any military operation. The United States simply considers that it enters into military confrontation only with extremely undemocratic, authoritarian, and dictatorial regimes. Over time, such explanations have been exhausted, and after interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, almost any larger military operation has become unacceptable.

NATO sees itself as the military umbrella of liberal values, which excludes any possibility of sharper conflicts, regardless of who is in power, as long as they are members of the Alliance. In that sense, the same logic would apply to the two Albanian states. Both would have a right to vote in the NATO Council, just as it could soon be the case in the Council of Europe, where the issue of Kosovo's membership is currently being considered.

The arrangement outlined in Brussels is based on the Ahtisaari plan and is not the idea of a "Greater Albania". Instead, it follows the "2+2" structure, where there are two independent Albanian states with centers in Tirana and Pristina and two Albanian communities in Slavic-majority states - North Macedonia and Montenegro. The Ahtisaari plan envisioned that Kosovo's independence would be accepted only on the condition that Kosovo could not unite with any other state in the region.

The symbolism is not insignificant that Pristina and Belgrade reached an agreement in Ohrid on the Annex to the agreement on the path to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, where the agreement was signed by Albanian political parties with the then President of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski. Participants stated that there was no "Bosnization" of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, meaning the creation of a Republika Srpska, which is now being sought in the case of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo. Therefore, the same principles may apply to North Macedonia and Kosovo in this regard: what is enabled for Albanians must be accessible to the Serbs in Kosovo. Kosovo will reciprocally apply the same as what applies to North Macedonia. If an Albanian has become the prime minister of North Macedonia, then Kosovo must be ready at some point for a Serb to become the Prime Minister of the Kosovo Government.

Expectations from the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina have significantly increased. From the American side, James O'Brien has personally become involved in them, while we have had little opportunity to hear from the official American mediator, Gabriel Escobar, in recent months. O'Brien insists on changing the Ohrid Agreement, more precisely, he seeks the rapid establishment of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. This would close the "Kosovo issue" before the US elections, 25 years after the bombing and the upcoming 75th anniversary of NATO this summer. However, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade firmly asserts something else: that Kosovo will only be resolved after the conclusion of the Russian operation in Ukraine. All of this resembles the race between Achilles and the tortoise.