Change of power in Syria and Kosovo – is recognition closer or just as distant?

The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who held the position for nearly 25 years, is seen by former Kosovo Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj as a good opportunity for Pristina to secure recognition not only from Syria but also from Lebanon and Iraq. However, experts on Middle Eastern affairs, speaking to Kosovo Online, believe that Kosovo's issue will not be a priority for the new Syrian leadership, and they also point out that Damascus, along with Baghdad and Beirut, has deep-seated reasons for not having recognized Kosovo thus far. However, a change in stance is not entirely ruled out, particularly if Turkey, the EU, or the US exert substantial influence.

Written by Dusica Radeka Djordjevic

Hoxhaj believes that Pristina should be among the first to recognize the interim government in Syria. According to him, the departure of these countries, including Lebanon and Iraq, from Iran’s sphere of influence could open doors to increasing the number of countries recognizing Kosovo.

The last country to recognize Kosovo was Israel, four years ago, despite its unresolved disputes with Syria dating back to the 1980s over the annexation of the Golan Heights. Currently, fewer than half of UN member states recognize Kosovo, 83 countries in total, not including three (Egypt, Peru, and the Dominican Republic) that have effectively frozen their recognition.
Speaking about the new circumstances in the Middle East, Hoxhaj specifically mentioned Egypt as one of the countries whose recognition was obtained because Pristina took advantage of the opportunity presented by the "Arab Spring."

Islamologist and former ambassador to Turkey, Darko Tanaskovic, tells Kosovo Online that Hoxhaj’s assessments should be taken seriously, as he is a seasoned diplomat with good connections in some European capitals. However, Tanaskovic also identifies several problematic aspects in Hoxhaj’s analysis.

“Hoxhaj sees the ‘victory’ of Sunni Islam as the fundamental positive change, implying that Kosovo, whose representatives continually emphasize their para-state’s pro-European and democratic orientation, counts on the solidarity and support of Islamic world actors, many of whom have serious terrorist associations,” Tanaskovic said.

He also points out the fundamental reasons why Kosovo has not secured more recognition within the Islamic world.

“The lack of enthusiasm for recognizing Kosovo’s separatist statehood, exhibited by many predominantly Muslim countries, is by no means primarily the result of any Iranian influence, as suggested by Enver Hoxhaj, but instead, it stems from the fact that these countries themselves face issues of acutely or potentially threatened territorial integrity. This is particularly true for Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, whose recognition of Kosovo the Kosovo politician and diplomat hopes for,” Tanaskovic said.

However, Tanaskovic notes that this does not mean new recognitions are impossible, especially if Turkey or other influential international actors were to lobby for them in Syria, because, as he said, “right now, everyone seems to be ‘fishing in troubled waters.’”

Hoxhaj’s reference to Kosovo’s successful campaign for recognition during the “Arab Spring,” when Kuwait, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen recognized Kosovo, is numerically correct, according to Tanaskovic. However, he points out that the Kosovo politician neglects the fact that these recognitions, with the possible exception of Kuwait, were not accompanied by the development of any substantive diplomatic or other relations with the mentioned countries.

“For Iran, the stance on ‘Kosovo’ is not based on some Shia aversion to Sunnis, as if Kosovars, on the whole, are particularly devout Sunnis, but rather on the perception of ‘Kosovo’ as an American and Western project. For them, Kosovo is analogous to Israel in this regard. I personally confirmed this view during my time in Tehran,” Tanaskovic said.

Foreign policy analyst Mirko Dautovic considers Hoxhaj’s position overly optimistic. In his view, the new authorities in Damascus have far more pressing concerns than deliberating whether to recognize Kosovo.

He believes this issue might only arise if Western countries decide to invest significantly by offering Damascus substantial financial aid or if the EU and the US condition the lifting of sanctions on Syria upon its recognition of Kosovo.

Dautovic considers the statement by former Kosovo Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj, that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime opens opportunities for Kosovo to gain new recognitions, to be overly optimistic, adding that he does not believe Damascus will be incentivized to recognize Kosovo.

As an important factor, Dautovic emphasizes that Damascus faces an even greater problem than Serbia does with Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence, a move that the International Court of Justice determined was not in violation of international law, as there have been previous instances where new states emerged from existing ones.

“Damascus has the Golan Heights, as well as the zone south and west of the city, including Quneitra, which Israel occupied in the last two weeks. They have territories that Israel has not only occupied but also annexed, which is a blatant violation of international law. Even if you argue that new states can emerge from old ones, you cannot annex the territories of other countries, which is what Israel did in 1980 with the Golan Heights,” Dautovic explains for Kosovo Online.

He also notes that the new authorities in Damascus have retained much of the same administration, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still functioning as it did under Assad.

“The management has changed, but the organization remains the same. Diplomats in Syrian embassies worldwide didn’t even wait 24 hours before hoisting the new Syrian flags and removing Assad’s. Essentially, the bureaucratic and expert apparatus of these institutions remains intact, and they will likely provide a clear, unbiased assessment: if we recognize Kosovo, which is a murky case in international relations, we will legitimize Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights,” Dautovic states.

He reminds that Israel recognized Kosovo’s independence, and Kosovo reciprocated by recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2020 under the Washington Agreement. This move, he says, aligned Kosovo against most Muslim-majority countries that had previously recognized it.

“This was a duplicitous move by Pristina, which is not uncommon in international relations, to initially lobby for Muslim support for its independence and then, 12 years later, recognize the country that is the greatest thorn in the side of the Muslim population: Israel, with Jerusalem as its capital. In this sense, Syrian recognition of Kosovo could lead to accusations that the new regime in Damascus is working for Israel, the West, and US allies. They don’t need this headache unless they receive something substantial, such as the lifting of sanctions,” Dautovic said.

Regarding the change in Syria’s government, Hoxhaj described it as a strategic opportunity for Kosovo to overcome Iranian influence in Lebanon and Iraq. However, Dautovic argues that Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran share the same challenges as Syria, if not to an even greater extent, because certain provinces in these countries also wish to secede and join other states.

“Iran has South Azerbaijan, which might want to join the state of Azerbaijan, as well as the Balochistan and Khuzestan provinces, the latter inhabited by Arabs. Both Iran and Iraq, as well as Syria, have Kurdish areas that would gladly secede or seek autonomy. Lebanon, too, is paralyzed by its internal political structures and cannot make decisions on anything, they haven’t been able to elect a president for two years. In this context, I think the former Kosovo foreign minister’s assessment is very optimistic from their perspective, but I see no basis for what he envisions, especially since Serbia enjoys significant presence and strong ties in all these countries,” Dautovic emphasizes.

Avni Mazreku, a professor of European law from Pristina, tells Kosovo Online that it is currently unclear whether the revolutionary forces holding transitional power in Syria will be pro-Eastern or pro-Western in orientation. Consequently, their position on recognizing Kosovo remains to be seen.

“In the broader context of Islamic countries, very few nations from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have recognized Kosovo, and I do not see a direct role of Iran in the recognition of Kosovo,” Mazreku said.

According to Mazreku, if the revolutionary forces in Syria take a pro-Western orientation, their stance on recognizing Kosovo will likely be more constructive. However, he notes that, so far, he has not seen any statements from the new Syrian leaders that indicate a pro-Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Regarding the Syrian population, Mazreku points out that it is not homogenous, as it comprises various ethnic groups, and that therefore, it is too early to predict their stance on Kosovo.

“There are three key factors in Syria: Iran, Russia, and Turkey. The relations of the new Syrian leaders with Russia are in a process of reconfiguration, even though Russia was one of the countries that bombed the military positions of the revolutionaries. We do not know what their orientation will be, whether pro-Eastern or pro-Western. If it is pro-Western, a more constructive approach to recognizing Kosovo’s independence can be expected,” Mazreku explained.